Mother’s Day May 14

Mother’s Day May 14

Joshua.

5月14日母亲节

约书亚

I wake, feverish. The skylight above me pulses with rain, and I spider my fingers across the sheets, remembering I’m alone. I close my eyes and find my way back to sleep, until I’m woken again, engulfed by a deep, sudden pain. I’ve been waking with a sick feeling every morning since he left, but I know right away this is different.

我醒来的时候,发烧。头顶的天窗随着雨水跳动着,我的手指在床单上划过,想起了我是孤独的。我闭上眼睛,重新进入梦乡,直到我再次醒来,被一种深深的、突然的疼痛所吞没。自从他离开后,我每天早上醒来都觉得恶心,但我马上知道这是不同的。

Something’s wrong.

出事了。

It hurts to walk, and I crawl from the bed, across the floor, which is gritty (多沙的)with sand and dust. I find my phone in the living room, but I don’t know who to call. He’s the only one I want to speak to. I need to tell him what’s happening and hear him say that everything will be fine. I need to remind him, just one more time, how much I love him.

走起来很疼,我从床上爬起来,穿过布满沙尘的地板。我在客厅找到了我的手机,但我不知道给谁打电话。他是我唯一想和他说话的人。我要告诉他发生了什么,听他说一切都会好起来的。我要提醒他,就一次,我有多爱他。

But he won’t answer. Or worse, he will, and he’ll seethe into the phone, telling me he won’t continue to put up with this, warning me that if I ever call him again, he’ll—

但是他不会回答。或更糟的是,他会的,他会看到电话,告诉我他不会继续忍受,警告我,如果我再打给他,他会——

The pain grips my back so hard I can’t breathe. I wait for it to pass, for the moment of reprieve I’ve been promised, but it doesn’t come. This isn’t what the books said would happen, nothing like what the doctor told me to expect. They said it’ll be gradual. That know what to do. time things. sit on the stoop-sale yoga ball I bought. stay home as long as possible, to avoid the machines, the drugs, all the things they do at the hospital to make a baby come before a body is ready.

疼得我后背发紧,喘不过气来。我等待着它过去,等待着承诺给我的缓刑,但它并没有到来。这不是书上说的会发生的事,也不是医生告诉我的那样。题目说它是渐进的。知道该做什么。时间的事情。坐在我买的stoop-sale瑜伽球上。尽可能呆在家里,避开机器、药物,以及医院里在身体准备好之前让婴儿出生的所有事情。

I’m not ready. It’s two weeks before my due date, and I’m not ready.

我还没有准备好。离预产期还有两周,但我还没准备好。

I focus on the phone. It’s not his number I dial, but hers, the doula(产妇陪护)—a pierced(穿刺的) woman named Albany I’ve met just twice.

我专注于电话。我拨的不是他的号码,而是她的,那个叫奥尔巴尼的妇女我只见过两次面。

I’m attending to a birth and cannot take your call. if you are—

我要接生,不能接你的电话。如果你是——

 

I crawl with my laptop to the bathroom and sit on the chilly tiles(瓷砖), a damp washcloth on my neck, the slim computer resting on the bulging outline of my son. I open my e-mail and begin a new message to them, the May Mothers.

我带着笔记本电脑爬到浴室,坐在冰冷的瓷砖上,脖子上放着一块湿漉漉的毛巾,轻薄的电脑放在儿子凸出的身体上。打开我的电子邮件,给五月的母亲们发一条新信息。

I’m wondering if this is normal. My hands tremble as I type. I feel nauseous(恶心). The pain is intense. It’s happening too quickly.

我想知道这是否正常。我打字时双手颤抖。我感到恶心。痛得很厉害。它发生得太快了。

They won’t respond. They’re out to dinner, eating something spicy to hasten(加快) their own labor, stealing sips from their husbands’ beer, enjoying a quiet evening together, something experienced mothers have warned us never to expect again. They won’t see my e-mail until morning.

她们不会回应。她们出去吃饭,吃一些辣的东西来加快自己的劳动速度,偷喝几口丈夫的啤酒,一起享受一个安静的夜晚,这些都是有经验的母亲警告过我们不要再期待的事情。他们直到早上才会看到我的电子邮件。

My e-mail chimes right away. Sweet Francie. It’s starting! she writes. Time the contractions and have your husband keep steady pressure on your lower back.

我的电子邮件马上响了。甜蜜的佛朗斯。这是开始!她写道。控制宫缩的时间,让你的丈夫对你的下背部保持稳定的压力。

How’s it going? Nell writes. Twenty minutes have passed. Still feeling it?

怎么样了?内尔写道。二十分钟过去了。还在感觉吗?

 

I’m on my side. I have trouble typing. Yes.

我是站在我这边的。我打字有困难。是的。

The room goes black, and when the light comes—ten minutes later, an hour later, I have no idea—I feel a gray ache blooming from a bump on my forehead. I crawl back to the living room, hearing a noise, an animal howling, before I realize the sound is coming from me. Joshua.

房间里一片漆黑,灯光一亮——十分钟后,一个小时后,我什么也不知道——我感到额头上的肿块开始隐隐发痛。我爬回客厅,听到一个声音,一个动物的嚎叫,然后我意识到声音来自我自己。约书亚。

I make it to the couch and rest my back against the cushions. I reach down between my legs. Blood.

我走到沙发前,背靠在靠垫上。我把手伸到两腿之间。血。

 

I pull a thin rain jacket over my nightgown. Somehow, I make my way down the stairs.

我在睡衣上穿一件薄雨衣。不知何故,我下楼了。

Why haven’t I packed the bag? The May Mothers have all written so much about what to pack in the bag, and yet mine is still in the bedroom closet, empty. No iPod with relaxing music inside, no coconut water, no peppermint oil for the nausea. Not even one printed copy of my birth plan. I cradle my stomach under a misty streetlight until the car service arrives and I climb into the clammy(潮湿的) back seat, trying not to notice the troubled look on the driver’s face.

我怎么还没收拾行李?五月的妈妈们已经写了很多关于包里应该装什么东西,但是我的仍然在卧室的壁橱里空着。里面没有放着轻松音乐的iPod,没有椰子水,没有让人恶心的薄荷油。连一份打印出来的计划清单都没有。我在雾蒙蒙的路灯下抱着肚子,直到汽车来了。我爬进潮湿的后座,尽量不去注意司机脸上不安的表情。

I forgot the going-home outfit I bought for the baby.

我忘了买给婴儿的回家衣服。

At the hospital, someone directs me to the sixth floor, where I’m told to wait in the triage(分诊) room. “Please,” I finally say to the woman behind the desk. “I feel very cold and dizzy. Can you call my doctor?”

在医院,有人将我带到六楼,被告知要在分诊室等。 “求你了。”我终于对桌子后面的那个女人说。 “我感到非常寒冷和头晕。你能给我的医生打电话吗?”

It’s not my doctor’s night. It’s another woman from the practice, one I’ve never met. I’m overcome with fear as I take a seat, where I begin to leak liquid that smells like earth, like the backyard mud my mother and I used to comb for worms when I was six, onto the green plastic chair.

今天不是我的专属医生值班。是另一个实习的女人,一个我从未见过的女人。当我坐下来,我开始在绿色的塑料椅子上洒出闻起来像泥土的液体,就像我母亲和我六岁时在后院用来清理虫子的泥土一样。

I go into the hallway, determined to keep moving, to stay upright, picturing his face when I told him. He was angry, insisting I’d tricked him. Demanding I get rid of the baby. This will ruin everything, he said. My marriage. My reputation. You can’t do this to me.

我走到走廊上,决心继续走,站直身子,想象着我告诉他的时候他的表情。他很生气,坚持说我骗了他。要求我把孩子处理掉。这会毁了一切,他说。我的婚姻。我的名声。你不能这样对我。

I won’t let you.

我不会让你得逞的。

I didn’t tell him I’d already seen the blinking green light of the heartbeat, that I’d heard the rhythm, a quickly spinning jump rope, emanating(产生) from the speakers in the ceiling. I didn’t tell him I’ve never wanted anything as much as I want this baby.

我没有告诉他我已经看到心跳闪烁的绿灯,我听到了节奏,一根快速旋转的跳绳,从天花板上的扬声器发出。我没有告诉他我从来没有想要过这个孩子。

 

Sturdy (坚定的)wrists lift me from the floor. Grace. That’s what it says on her name tag. Grace leads me to a room, her hands around my waist, and tells me to lie down on the bed. I fight. I don’t want to lie on the bed. I want to know the baby is all right. I want the pain to subside(减退). “I want the epidural(硬膜外麻醉),” I say. “I’m sorry,” says Grace. “It’s too late.” I seize her hands, roughed by too much soap and hospital water. “No, please. Too late?” “For the epidural.” I think I hear footsteps in the hallway, rushing toward my room. I think I hear him calling for me. I give in and lie down. It’s him. It’s Joshua, calling to me through the darkness. The doctor’s here. She’s speaking to me, and they’re wrapping something around my bicep(二头肌), sticking a needle smoothly under my skin, at the bend of my arm, like the blades of skates over ice. They’re asking who’s come with me, where my husband is. The room spins around me, and I can smell it. The liquid seeping (渗出)from me. Like earth and mud. My bones are splitting(裂开). I’m on fire. It can’t be right. I feel the pressure. I feel the fire. I feel my body, my baby, breaking in two. I close my eyes. I push.

 

强壮的手腕把我从地板上举起来。恩典。她的名牌上就是这么写的。格雷斯把我带到一个房间,她的手搂着我的腰,叫我躺在床上。我战斗。我不想躺在床上。我想知道孩子是否安然无恙。我希望疼痛能消失。“我要硬膜外麻醉,”我说。“对不起,”格雷斯说。“太晚了。”我抓住她的手,她的手被太多的肥皂和医院的水弄得粗糙不堪。“不,求你了。太迟了吗?”“硬膜外。”我想我听到走廊里有脚步声,他们朝我的房间冲来。我想我听到他在叫我。我屈服了,躺了下来。这是他。是约书亚,在黑暗中呼唤我。这里的医生的。她在对我说话,他们在我的二头肌上缠了些东西,用针平稳地刺在我的皮肤下,在我手臂的弯曲处,就像溜冰鞋在冰上的刀刃一样。他们问谁跟我一起来了,我丈夫在哪里。房间在我周围旋转,我能闻到它。液体从我身上渗出来。像泥土。我的骨头都要裂开了。我着火了。这不可能是对的。我感到了压力。我感觉到火。我感觉到我的身体,我的孩子,裂成两半。我闭上眼睛。我推。

 

 

1. Feverish = 发烧的

– She lay in bed, too feverish to sleep

她躺在床上,发烧得无法入睡。

– I’m feeling a bit feverish – I hope it’s not the start of flu.

我有点发烧-我希望这不是流感的开始.

 

2. Something’s wrong = 出问题了

– I have a bad feeling that something’s wrong.

我有种不好的感觉,好像哪里出问题了。

– Is there something wrong sweetheart? We can always talk through it.

亲爱的有什么问题吗? 我们可以随时讨论.

 

3. Or worse = 或者更差

– Work is, for better or worse, becoming more flexible nowadays.

无论现在好坏,工作变得越来越灵活。

– They would criticize me, or worse yet, pay me no attention.

他们会批评我,或者更糟的是,我不会被关注。

 

4. Reprieve = 暂时解救

– But any last-minute reprieve may come too late.

但是任何最后一刻的缓刑都可能为时已晚。

– She was too grateful for the reprieve.

她为缓刑感到非常感谢。

 

5. Due date = 截止日期

– It’s five days until my baby’s due date.

还有5天就到孩子预计出生的日子。

– To avoid the late charge, please make your payment on or before the payment due date.

为避免滞纳金,请在付款到期日或之前付款。

 

6. Bulging =鼓起

– His pocket was bulging with sweets.

因为装满了糖,他的口袋鼓起来了。

– I don’t like body builders who are so overdeveloped you can see the veins in their bulging muscle.

我不喜欢那些过于发达的健美运动员,你可以看到他们肌肉膨胀中的静脉。

 

7. Nauseous = 感到恶习

– I am a little nauseous from the medication.

这个药物让我感到有些恶心。

– I felt a bit nauseous during the sea crossing.

过海的时候让我有点恶心。

 

8. Quiet evening = 安静的夜晚

– I’d rather not go out and have a quiet evening on my own.

和出去玩相比,我更想自己一个人度过安静的夜晚。

– Can we have a quiet evening, just me and you?

我们能度过一个安静的夜晚吗,只有你和我?

 

9. Steady pressure = 稳定的压力

– To ease the swelling, apply steady pressure to the ice packet.

为减轻肿胀,请对冰袋施加稳定的压力。

– Can you apply steady pressure to my back?

你可以在我的后背上施加稳定的压力吗?

 

10. Somehow = 出于某种原因/以某种方式

– We must stop him from seeing her somehow.

我们必须以某种方式停止他们见面。

– I’ve somehow managed to bluff my way through the interview.

也不知怎样,我就蒙混过关了面试。

 

11. Clammy = 湿腻的

– Make sure your hands aren’t clammy when you are shaking hands.

握手的时候,确保手不是湿腻的。

– It was a hot, clammy day.

那是一个酷热又湿腻的一天。

 

12. Subside = 减退

– His rage was beginning to subside.

他的愤怒开始消退。

– The police are hoping that the violence will soon subside.

警察们希望暴力会快速的减退。

The little prince

CHAPTER ONE

第一章

Once when I was six years old I saw a beautiful picture in a book about the primeval (原始的)forest called True Stories. It showed a boa (蟒蛇)constrictor(大蟒蛇) swallowing an animal.

有一次,我六岁的时候,在一本关于原始森林的书中看到了一张美丽的图画,叫做《真实故事》。它显示了一条大蟒蛇吞咽了一只动物。

The book stated: ‘Boa constrictors swallow their prey (猎物)whole without chewing it whereupon(接着,随之) they can no longer move and sleep for six months digesting it.’ I then reflected (思考)deeply upon the adventures in the jungle and in turn succeeded in making my first drawing with a colour pencil.

这本书中写道:“这些蟒蛇把它们的猎物不加咀嚼地囫囵吞下,尔后就再也不能动弹,要在六个月的睡眠中消化它们。随后,我对丛林中的历险进行了深入的思考,并成功地用彩色铅笔画出了我的第一幅画。

I showed my masterpiece to the grown-ups and asked them if my drawing frightened them. They answered: ‘Why should anyone be frightened by a hat?’ My drawing did not represent a hat. It was supposed to be a boa constrictor digesting an elephant. So I made another drawing of the inside of the boa constrictor to enable the grown-ups to understand. They always need explanations.

我把我的杰作拿给大人们看,问他们我的画是不是吓着他们了。他们回答说:“为什么人会被一顶帽子吓倒呢?”我画的不是帽子。它应该是一条正在消化大象的蟒蛇。于是我又画了一幅巨蟒肚子的画,让大人们看得懂。他们总是需要解释。

The grown ups then advised me to give up my drawings of boa constrictors, whether from the inside or the outside, and to devote myself instead to geography, history, arithmetic and grammar. Thus it was that I gave up a magnificent career as a painter at the age of six. I had been disappointed by the lack of success of my drawing No. I and my drawing No. 2. Grown-ups never understand anything by themselves and it is rather tedious(无聊的) for children to have to explain things to them time and again.

大人们劝我不要再画这些开着肚皮或开着肚皮的大蟒蛇了,让我去学地理、历史、算术和语法吧。就这样,我在六岁时放弃了辉煌的画家生涯。我的第一号作品没有成功,这使我很失望。我和我的画2号。成年人靠他们自己什么都不懂,而孩子们要一遍又一遍地向他们解释是相当乏味的。

Thus I lived alone, with no one I could really talk to, until I had an accident in the Sahara Desert six years ago. Something broke down in my engine. And since there was neither a mechanic (机械师)nor a passenger with me, I prepared myself for a difficult but what I hoped would be a successful repair. It was a matter of life or death for me. I had scarcely enough drinking water for a week.

就这样,我一个人住着,没有一个可以真正交谈的人,直到六年前我在撒哈拉沙漠发生了意外。我的引擎坏了。由于我身边既没有机械师,也没有乘客,所以我做好了准备,进行一次困难但我希望能成功的修理。对我来说,这是生死攸关的事。我几乎喝不了一个星期的水。

On the first night, I fell asleep on the sand, a thousand miles from any human habitation. I was far more isolated than a shipwrecked (沉船的)sailor on a raft in the middle of the ocean. So you can imagine my surprise at sunrise when an odd little voice woke me up.

第一天晚上,我在远离人烟千里之外的沙滩上睡着了。我比大海中一只木筏上一个遇难的水手要孤立得多。所以你可以想象我日出时的惊讶,一个奇怪的声音把我吵醒了。

It said: ‘Please…draw me a sheep.’

它说:“请……给我画一只羊。”

 

‘What?’

‘什么?’

‘Draw me a sheep.’

“给我画一只羊。”

I jumped up, completely thunderstruck(惊呆了). I rubbed my eyes, blinked hard and looked carefully around me. And I discovered an extraordinary little boy watching me gravely(严肃的). I drew a portrait of him. But of course, my drawing is not half as charming as its model. It is not my fault. I had been discouraged by grown-ups in my career as a painter when I was six years old, and I hadn’t learned to draw anything with the exception of boas from the outside and boas from the inside.

我跳了起来,完全惊呆了。我揉了揉眼睛,使劲眨了眨,仔细打量着四周。我发现一个特别的小男孩严肃地看着我。我为他画了一幅肖像。当然,我的画没有模特的一半迷人。这不是我的错。当我六岁的时候,我的画家生涯就被大人们搞得灰心丧气,除了从外面画蟒蛇,从里面画蟒蛇外,我什么也没学过。

I therefore stared in total astonishment at this sudden apparition(鬼怪,离奇的东西). So I had to choose another job and I learnt to pilot aeroplanes. I flew more or less all over the world. And indeed geography has been extremely useful to me. I am able to distinguish between China and Arizona at a glance. It is extremely helpful if one gets lost in the night.

因此,我完全惊奇地看着这个突然出现的东西。所以我不得不选择另一份工作,我学会了驾驶飞机。我差不多飞遍了全世界。地理确实对我非常有用。我一眼就能分辨出中国和亚利桑那州。如果一个人在晚上迷路了,这是非常有用的。

As a result of which I have been in touch, through-out my life, with all kinds of serious people. I have spent a lot of time with grown-ups. I have seen them at very close quarters (地区)which I’m afraid has not greatly enhanced my opinion of them.

因此,我一生都与各种严肃的人保持着联系。我花了很多时间和大人在一起。我曾近距离地见过他们,我担心这并没有使我对他们的看法有很大的改观。

Whenever I met one who seemed reasonably clear-sighted to me, I showed them my drawing No 2, which I had kept, as an experiment. I wanted to find out whether he or she was truly understanding. But the answer was always: ‘It is a hat.’ So I gave up mentioning boa constrictors or primeval forests or stars. I would bring myself down to his or her level and talk about bridge, golf, politics and neckties. And the grown-up would be very pleased to have met such a sensible person.

每当我遇到一个在我看来头脑相当清楚的人,我就给他们看我的第二号作品,那是我保存下来作为实验的。我想知道他或她是否真正理解我。但答案总是:“这是一顶帽子。”所以我就不再提蟒蛇、原始森林或星星了。我会把自己降低到他或她的水平,谈论桥牌、高尔夫、政治和领带。大人会很高兴遇到这样一个通情达理的人。

Do not forget that I was a thousand miles away from any inhabited region. But my little chap(小家伙) did not seem to be either lost or dead tired or dying of hunger, thirst or fear. He did not look like a child lost in the middle of the desert, a thousand miles from any inhabited region.

别忘了,我离任何有人居住的地方都有一千英里远。但我的小家伙似乎既没有迷路,也没有累得要死,也没有死于饥饿、口渴或恐惧。他不像一个迷失在沙漠中的孩子,远离人烟千里之外。

 

那我们接下来, 将找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子!

Analysis – Page 1

 

1. Primeval forest = 原始森林

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I went in to explore the primeval forest.

我去探索原始森林。

b) The railway cuts through the primeval forest.

铁路穿过原始森林

 

2. Boa constrictor = 蟒蛇

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He’s as friendly as a boa constrictor.

他和蟒蛇一样友好。

b) A boa constrictor squeezes its victims.

蟒蛇挤压受害者。

 

3. Whereupon = 于是

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He saw me coming, whereupon he offered me his seat.

他看到我来了,并让我坐在他的椅子上。

b) She laughed at him, whereupon he walked out.

她嘲笑了他,于是他走了出去。

 

4. Digesting = 消化

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I had a hard time digesting dinner.

我很难消化晚餐。

b) We chew food to help us digest it.

我们咀嚼食物以帮助消化。

 

5. Masterpiece = 杰作

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The book is a masterpiece.

这本书是杰作。

b) She has painted many masterpieces.

她画了许多杰作。

 

6. Devote = 致力 / 承诺

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He decided to devote his life to science.

他决定一生致力于科学。

b) When you marry, you promise to devote your life to one another.

结婚时,你承诺彼此一生。

 

7. Arithmetic = 算术

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I’ve never been very good at arithmetic.

我从不擅长算术。

b) They tried to teach their child mental arithmetic.

他们试图教孩子心理算术.

 

8. Tedious = 乏味

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) His jokes were getting quite tedious.

他的笑话变得很乏味。

b) All jobs are tedious.

所有工作都非常的乏味。

 

9. Mechanic = 修理工

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The mechanic fixed my car.

修理工修理了我的汽车。

b) I’ll call a mechanic to pick up the car.

我会叫技工来接车。

 

10. A matter of Life and Death = 关于生与死的问题

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) This is a matter of life and death for me.

这对我来说是生死相关的问题。

b) Don’t bother me unless it’s a matter of life and death.

除非这是关于生与死的问题,否则请不要打扰我。

 

11. Scarcely enough = 几乎没有足够

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) There is scarcely enough food.

几乎没有足够的食物。

b) I earn scarcely enough money to get the bus home.

我挣的钱几乎不足以让我用公共汽车回家。

 

12. Human habitation = 人类居住

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The house was unfit for human habitation.

房子不适合人类居住。

b) There is not a single human habitation in this area.

该地区没有人类居住。

 

13. Shipwrecked = 岛上遇难

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) Try and imagine being shipwrecked on an island!

试想一下在一个岛上遇难!

b) The sailors were shipwrecked on the beach.

水手们在海滩上遇难。

 

 

 

 

 

14. Thunderstruck = 震惊

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I was thunderstruck when he gave me a present.

当他给我礼物时,我很震惊。

b) She was thunderstruck to hear the news.

她听到这消息感到很震惊。

 

15. Portrait = 肖像

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She painted a portrait of her family.

她画了家人的画像。

b) They had many portraits on their wall.

他们的墙上有很多肖像。

 

16. Astonishment = 惊讶

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He looked at her in astonishment.

他惊讶地看着她。

b) To my astonishment, she quit her job.

令我惊讶的是,她辞掉了工作。

 

17. As a result of which = 因此

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I was angry at her, as a result of which, I stopped talking to her.

我生她的气,因此,我不再和她说话。

b) His work was all wrong, as a result of which, I also copied it down wrong.

他的工作全错了,因此,我也把它抄写错了。

 

18. Very close quarters = 住得很近

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The group had to sleep in very close quarters.

小组必须在非常近的地方睡觉。

b) I’m tired of living in very close quarters with them.

我已经厌倦了与他们住得很近。

 

19. I’m afraid = 我很伤心地说

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) It’s snowing outside, I’m afraid I’ll be late for work.

这里外面下雪了,我很伤心地认为,我会上班迟到。

b) If you cancel now, I’m afraid you lose your money.

如果你现在取消,我会很伤心地说你会失去你的钱。

 

20. Inhabited = 住

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The house was also inhabited by her grandparents.

她的祖父母也住过这所房子。

b) People have inhabited this area for thousands of years.

人们已经在该地区居住了数千年。

 

Lost Children Archive 儿童档案丢失

 

FAMILY LEXICON

LEXICON家庭

I don’t know what my husband and I will say to each of our children one day. I’m not sure which parts of our story we might each choose to edit out for them, and which ones we’ll shuffle(洗牌调动) around and insert back in to produce a final version—even though shuffling, and editing sounds is probably the best summary of what my husband and I do for a living. But the children will ask, because ask is what children do. And we’ll need to tell them a beginning, a middle, and an end. We’ll need to give them an answer, tell them a proper story.

我不知道有一天我和我的丈夫会对我们的每个孩子说些什么。我不确定我们每个人会选择编辑故事的哪一部分,也不确定我们会把哪一部分混在一起,然后再插入到最后的版本中————尽管洗牌声、剪辑声可能是对我和丈夫工作的最好总结。但是孩子们会问,因为问是孩子们做的事。我们需要告诉他们一个开始,一个中间和一个结束。我们需要给他们一个答案,告诉他们一个合适的故事。

The boy turned ten yesterday, just one day before we left New York. We got him good presents. He had specifically said:

在我们离开纽约的前一天,男孩变十岁了。我们送给他好礼物。他具体说过:

No toys.

不要玩具。

The girl is five, and for some weeks has been asking, insistently:

这个女孩只有五岁,并且坚持问了几个星期:

When do I turn six?

我什么时候六岁?

No matter our answer, she’ll find it unsatisfactory. So we usually say something ambiguous, like:

无论我们的回答如何,她都会感到不满意。因此,我们通常会说一些含糊不清的内容,例如:

Soon.

不久。

In a few months.

在几个月内。

Before you know it.

不知不觉中。

The girl is my daughter and the boy is my husband’s son. I’m a biological mother to one, a stepmother to the other, and a de facto (实际上的)mother in general to both of them. My husband is a father and a stepfather, to each one respectively, but also just a father. The girl and boy are therefore: step-sister, son, stepdaughter, daughter, step-brother, sister, stepson, brother. And because hyphenations (连字符)and petty nuances (细小的差别)complicate the sentences of everyday grammar—the us, the them, the our, the your—as soon as we started living together, when the boy was almost six and the girl still a toddler, we adopted the much simpler possessive adjective (所有格形容)our to refer to them two. They became: our children. And sometimes: the boy, the girl. Quickly, the two of them learned the rules of our private grammar, and adopted the generic (一般的)nouns Mama and Papa, or sometimes simply Ma and Pa. And until now at least, our family lexicon(词典) defined the scope and limits of our shared world.

女孩是我的女儿,男孩是我丈夫的儿子。我是其中一个的生母,是另一个的继母,也是他们两人的实际母亲。我的丈夫是一个父亲和一个继父,分别对每一个人,但也只是一个父亲。因此,女孩和男孩是:继姐妹、儿子、继女儿、女儿、继兄弟、姐妹、继子、兄弟。因为连字符和细微的差别会使日常语法中的句子变得复杂——我们,他们,我们的,你的——我们一开始住在一起,当男孩快六岁,女孩还在蹒跚学步的时候,我们就用更简单的所有格形容词our来指代他们两个。他们变成了:我们的孩子。有时是男孩,有时是女孩。很快,他们俩就学会了我们私人使用的语法规则,使用了一般名词“妈妈”和“爸爸”,有时也就是简单的“妈妈”和“爸爸”。至少到目前为止,我们的家庭词汇定义了我们共享世界的范围和限制。

FAMILY PLOT

家庭剧情

My husband and I met four years ago, recording a soundscape(声景) of New York City. We were part of a large team of people working for New York University’s Center for Urban Science and Progress. The soundscape was meant to sample and collect all the keynotes and the soundmarks that were emblematic(象征的) of the city: subway cars screeching(尖叫) to a halt, music in the long underground hallways of Forty-Second Street, ministers (牧师) preaching (布道)in Harlem, bells, rumors and murmurs inside the Wall Street stock exchange. But it also attempted to survey and classify all the other sounds that the city produced and that usually went by, as noise, unnoticed: cash registers opening and closing in delis(熟食店), a script (剧本)being rehearsed(彩排) in an empty Broadway theater, underwater currents in the Hudson, Canada geese flocking(蜂拥而至) and shitting over Van Cortlandt Park, swings swinging in Astoria playgrounds, elderly Korean women filing wealthy fingernails on the Upper West Side. There were journalists, sound artists, geographers, urbanists, writers, historians, musicians. Everyone, in couples or small groups, surveyed and sampled wavelengths around the city, like we were documenting the wavelengths around the city, like we were documenting the last sounds of an enormous beast.

我和我的丈夫四年前相识,当时我们正在录制纽约市的一个音景。我们是纽约大学城市科学与进步中心的一大批工作人员中的一员。“音景”是用来采样和收集所有代表这座城市的关键音和音标的:地铁车声嘎吱作响,四十二街长长的地下走廊里响起了音乐,牧师们在哈莱姆区布道,钟声,华尔街证券交易所里的谣言和窃窃私语。但它也试图对这座城市产生的,通常经过的所有其他声音进行调查和分类,因为这些声音通常被忽略,如杂音:收银机打开和关闭在熟食店,剧本在空荡荡的百老汇剧院排练,哈德逊河中的海流加拿大大雁在范·科特兰公园(Van Cortlandt Park)上蜂拥而至,在阿斯托里亚(Astoria)操场上荡秋千,韩国老妇在上西城(Upper West Side)挥舞着富有的指甲。有记者、声音艺术家、地理学家、城市规划专家、作家、历史学家、音乐家。每个人,成双成对或小组,对城市周围的波长进行调查和采样,就像我们在记录城市周围的波长,就像我们在记录一只巨大野兽的最后声音。

The two of us were paired up and given the task of recording all the languages spoken in the city, over a period of four calendar years. The description of our duties specified: “surveying the most linguistically diverse metropolis(大都市) on the planet, and mapping the entirety of languages that its adults and children speak.” We were good at it, it turned out; maybe even really good. We made a perfect team of two. Then, after working together for just a few months, we fell in love—completely, like a rock might fall in love with a bird, not knowing who the rock was and who the bird—and when summer arrived, we decided to move in together.

我们两个人被分配了一项任务,要在四年的时间里,记录这个城市里说的所有语言。我们的职责是:“调查这个星球上最具语言多样性的大都市,并对其成年人和儿童说的所有语言进行测绘。”事实证明,我们很擅长;也许真的很好。我们两个人组成了一个完美的团队。然后,在一起工作了几个月之后,我们完全坠入了爱河——就像石头爱上了小鸟,却不知道谁是石头,谁是小鸟——当夏天来临的时候,我们决定搬到一起住。

The girl remembers nothing about that period, of course. The boy says he remembers that I was always wearing an old blue cardigan (羊毛开衫)that had lost a couple of buttons and came down to my knees, and that sometimes, when we rode the subway or buses—always with freezing air pouring out—I’d take it off and use it as a blanket to cover him and the girl, and that it smelled of tobacco and was itchy. Moving in together had been a rash (草率的)decision—messy, confusing, urgent, and as beautiful and real as life feels when you’re not thinking about its consequences. Then came the consequences. We met each other’s relatives, got married, started filing joint taxes(共同纳税), became a family.

当然,那个女孩对那段时间什么都不记得了。这个男孩说,他记得我一直戴着旧的蓝色开衫,失去了几个纽扣,坠落到膝盖上,有时候,当我们乘坐地铁或公共汽车时-总是有冷空气-我会取下它,用它盖毯子盖住他和女孩,闻起来有烟草味,而且很痒。搬到一起是一个草率的决定——混乱、紧迫,就像你不考虑后果时的生活感觉一样美好和真实。接下来是后果。我们见了对方的亲戚,结了婚,开始共同纳税,成了一家人。

 

那我们接下来, 将找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子!

Analysis – Page 1

1. Edit out = 删除

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) We edit out the rude words.

我们删除不礼貌的单词。

b) He had to edit out the repetitive sentences.

他必须删除重复的句子。

2. Shuffling = 翻、洗、像洗牌一样

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She was shuffling through the newspapers.

她正在翻报纸。

b) He was shuffling the cards for us to play a game.

他正在为我们的游戏洗牌。

3. Ambiguous = 模棱两可

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He gave me an ambiguous answer.

他给了我一个模棱两可的答案。

b) His job is rather ambiguous, I don’t know what he does.

他的工作比较模糊,我也不知道他在干什么。

4. De facto = 事实上

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The city is becoming the de facto financial center of the world.

事实上,这个城市正在成为世界金融中心。

b) They were the de facto leader of the group.

他们是该小组的事实的领导人。

5. Stepchild / stepbrother / stepsister / stepmother / stepfather = 继子女/继兄弟/继姊/继母/继父

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She has 2 stepbrothers.

她有两个继兄弟。

b) He takes great care of his stepchildren.

他非常照顾继子。

6. Petty nuances = 细微差别

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) There are petty nuances between his story and mine.

他的故事和我的故事之间有一些细微的差别。

b) He focused on the petty nuances in my work.

他专注于我工作中的细微差别。

7. Lexicon = 词典

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She needs to add please and thank you to her lexicon.

她需要在她的词典中添加请和谢谢。

b) Oily food equals unhealthy in most people’s lexicon.

在大多数人的词典中,油性食物等于不健康。

8. Scope and limits = 范围和限制

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The scope and limits of the work is in the job advertisement.

工作范围和限制在招聘广告中。

b) We can look at the scope and limits of her authority.

我们可以看看她的权限范围和限制。

Analysis – Page 2

 

9. Soundscape = 音景

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) There is a rich soundscape in New York.

纽约有丰富的声景。

b) There is a chaotic soundscape of shouting and music.

嘈杂的呼喊声和音乐声景。

 

10. Keynotes = 基调

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The keynote speaker was the Director.

主旨发言人为主任。

b) World peace was the keynote of his speech.

世界和平是他演讲的主题。

11. Emblematic = 象征性的

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The sword is emblematic of violence.

剑象征着暴力。

b) A crown is emblematic of royalty.

皇冠象征着皇室贵族。

 

12. Screeching to a halt = 咔咔停止了

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The car came screeching to a halt.

汽车 咔咔作响。

b) The whole project came screeching to a halt when he left.

当他离开时,整个项目都停止了。

 

场景应用(scenario applications) –

This phrase can be used to describe a literal car screeching to a halt, or it can be used as a metaphor to describe something coming to a sudden end.

这句话可以用来形容汽车突然停下来,或者可以用作隐喻来形容即将到来的事情。

 

13. Wall Street stock exchange = 华尔街证券交易所

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) On the Wall Street stock exchange, stock prices fell.

在华尔街证券交易所,股价下跌。

b) The Wall Street stock exchange has international stocks.

华尔街证券交易所拥有国际股票。

14. Broadway theater = 百老汇剧院

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) We went to watch a play at a Broadway theater.

我们去了百老汇剧院看戏。

b) The musical ran on a Broadway theatre for 6 months.

音乐剧在百老汇剧院上演了六个月

15. Metropolis = 大都市

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The city has become a huge metropolis.

这个城市已经成为一个巨大的大都市。

b) I’d prefer to live in the countryside than a metropolis.

我比大都市更喜欢住在乡下。

16. Rash decision = 轻率决定

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He made a rash decision and now he’s suffering.

他做出了轻率的决定,现在正受苦

b) Her rash decision made her lose her job.

她的轻率决定使她失去了工作。

 

Right Behind You

Monday

星期一

I wake feeling groggy (昏沉的)after a restless night. I usually fall immediately into a dreamless sleep, but each time I started to drift off, the text that arrived during lunch flashed before my eyes.

在一个不安定的夜晚后,我感到昏昏沉沉。我通常会立即陷入无梦的睡眠,但是每次我开始要入睡时,午饭时收到的短信会在我眼前闪烁。

CALL ME!

打给我!

That’s all it said but it was enough.

仅此而已,但足够了。

I ignored it.

我忽略了它。

I snuggle (依偎)down for a few extra minutes, pushing all thoughts of those two words and the subtle threat they hold to the back of my mind, focusing instead on what the week ahead might bring. I probably put on a pound rather than lose the six I’m planning to, but maybe this is the week when I’ll get my big break — a star role in a big TV drama. Despite thinking the same thing every Monday for about fifteen years, I am still optimistic.

我又多躺了几分钟,把这两个词的所有想法和它们所带来的微妙威胁都抛到脑后,把注意力集中在接下来的一周可能会发生的事情上。我可能会增重一磅,而不是失去我计划要增重的六磅,但也许这周我将获得一个重大突破——在一部大型电视剧中扮演明星角色。尽管15年来每个星期一我都在想同样的事情,但我仍然很乐观。

I love Monday mornings. The start of a new week fills me with renewed optimism, but today my customary happiness is dampened(抑制) as I realise I am not going to be able to ignore the text for much longer.

我喜欢星期一的早晨。新的一周的开始让我充满了新的乐观情绪,但是今天我的惯常幸福感减弱了,因为我意识到我将无法再长时间忽略短信。

Before I get a chance to think of a suitable response, Millie comes skipping into the room fully dressed in her school uniform. She looks adorable and so smart. Her spindly(纺锤形的) little legs stick out below her skirt, and I remind myself to buy her a new one soon. She’s nearly grown out of this one.

在我有机会考虑合适的答案之前,米莉穿着自己的学校制服跳进教室。她看起来很可爱,很聪明。她那条细麻布的小腿伸出裙子下面,我提醒自己尽快给她买一条新的。裙子几乎已经小了。

Ash is long gone. He has a full list today — several operations — and I wonder how he does it. I know sometimes he finds the pressure almost overwhelming, but his patients love him. So do the nurses, as I’ve noticed when we’ve been to any of the hospital gatherings that he occasionally agrees we should attend.

Ash早已离开了。他今天有一份完整的清单——几项手术——我想知道他是怎么做到的。我知道有时候他觉得压力太大了,但他的病人都很喜欢他。我注意到,当我们参加医院的聚会时,他偶尔也会同意我们参加。

I’m not surprised they like him. He’s enigmatic(高深莫测的) and doesn’t smile for no reason. He’s quite measured in his ways and would never want to cause anyone a moment’s distress(痛苦), but it’s hard to tell what he’s thinking, and I bet they find that intriguing(有趣的). Plus, I can’t deny that with his dark colouring and lovely brown eyes, he’s a bit special. But he’s mine, and he’s staying that way, so they can think what they like.

我不奇怪他们喜欢他。他是个高深莫测的人,从不无缘无故地微笑。他做事很谨慎,从来不想给别人带来任何痛苦,但很难说他在想什么,我敢打赌他们会觉得这很有趣。此外,我不能否认,他的深色和可爱的棕色眼睛,他有点特别。但他是我的,而且他一直都是这样,所以他们可以想什么就想什么。

‘Mummy, are you getting up?’

“妈咪,你要起床吗?”

I shake myself out of my daydreams.

我摆脱了白日梦。

‘Sorry, Millie, I’ll just hop in the shower. I’ll be down in a minute.’

“抱歉,米莉,我去洗个澡。我等会儿下来。”

I do find it hard to get out of bed. I enjoy lying there, planning my day, thinking about little treats for Millie and what to cook for our supper. Millie, on the other hand, wakes up and leaps out of bed every morning, eager to start her day. I force myself to throw back the duvet (羽绒被)and head to the bathroom, pushing all thoughts of the text message from my mind.

我确实很难下床。我喜欢躺在那里,计划自己的一天,考虑给米莉一点零食,以及为我们的晚餐做饭。另一方面,米莉每天早晨醒来就跳下床,渴望开始新的一天。我强迫自己把羽绒被扔回去,上厕所,把所有关于短信的想法从我的脑海中挤出来。

We always walk to school, unless I’m running late, and even in this cold, damp weather, Millie skips along happily.

我们总是走路上学,除非我要迟到,即使在寒冷潮湿的天气下,米莉也开心地跳着步。

We’re no sooner out of the gate than I begin to wonder if I should have driven her this morning. I feel a prickle (刺痛)at the back of my neck, as if eyes are touching me, and I spin round to look behind me.

我们离开大门不远时,我开始怀疑今天早上是否应该开车送她。我的脖子后部感到刺痛,好像眼睛在抚摸我,我转身转身看向我后面。

那我们接下来, 将找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子!

Analysis – Page 1

1. Groggy = 很不舒服

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I feel very groggy because I have a cold.

因为感冒,我感到很不舒服。

b) I didn’t sleep, I’m feeling quite groggy.

我没睡,我感到很闷闷不乐。

 

2. Restless night =一个不安的夜晚

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I had a restless night and don’t want to go to work.

我有一个不安的夜晚,不想上班。

b) She’s really stressed, she won’t eat and is having restless nights.

她真的有很大压力,不会进食,并且晚上会很不安。

 

3. Drift off = 睡觉了

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) If I’m tired, I drift off to sleep very quickly.

如果我累了,我会很快入睡。

b) I got into bed and drifted off.

我上床睡觉了。

 

4. Snuggle down = 睡觉了

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) They were snuggled down on the sofa together.

他们一起睡在沙发上。

b) I’d love to snuggle down in bed now.

我现在想睡在床上。

 

5. Put on a pound = 体重增加

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I’ve put on a pound since changing my diet.

自从改变饮食以来,我已经增加了体重。

b) That was such a big meal I’ve put on a pound.

我吃了一顿大餐,现在体重增加了。

 

类似的短语(similar phrases)

Pile on the pounds

 

6. Big break =重大突破

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I keep thinking I’ll get my big break soon.

我一直认为我会尽快获得重大突破。

b) He was living in New York waiting for his big break.

他住在纽约,等待他的突破机会。

 

7. Dampened = 抑制

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The rain dampened their mood.

雨抑制了他们的心情。

b) After losing they had dampened spirits.

失败后,他们情绪低落。

 

8. I wonder how he does it = 我想知道他是怎么做到的

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He’s got so much money; I wonder how he does it.

他有很多钱,我想知道他是怎么做到的。

b) She’s so successful, I wonder how she does it.

她是如此成功,我想知道她是如何做到的。

 

9. Enigmatic =神秘的

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She had an enigmatic smile on her face.

她脸上充满神秘的微笑。

b) This was a really enigmatic film.

这是一部非常神秘的电影。

 

10. Bet = 敢打赌

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I bet it will rain soon.

我敢打赌它将很快下雨。

b) I bet that we’ll finish this today.

我敢打赌,我们今天将完成此操作。

 

11. Daydreams =做白日梦

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) He daydreams of being a journalist.

他做的白日梦就是自己成为记者。

b) Today I had daydreams of a warm beach.

今天,我做的白日梦是温暖海滩。

 

12. No sooner = 刚完的时候

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) No sooner than we were seated, they brought us wine.

我们一入场,他们就带来了酒。

b) No sooner than I finished lunch, the phone rang.

我刚吃完午饭,电话响了。

 

13. Prickle =刺痛

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She felt a prickle of fear.

她感到恐惧的刺痛。

b) There was a prickle down his spine.

他的脊椎刺痛了一下。

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Falling in love with robots

Abstract

Is it possible for human beings to establish romantic relationships with robots? What kind of otherness, or alterity, will be construed in the process of falling in love with a robot? Can a robotic companion mean more than being a tool for house-work, a caretaker, an aid of self-gratification, or a sex-doll? Phenomenological analysis of love experience suggests that romantic feelings necessarily include experiencing the alterity of the partner as an affective subjectivity that freely, willingly, and passionately commits to its partner. The romantic commitment is expected to stem from the sentient inner selves of the lovers, which is one of the features that robots are lacking. Thus the artificial alterity might disengage our romantic aspirations, and, as argued by many, will make them morally inferior to intraspecies love affairs. The current analysis will restrain from ethical considerations, however, and will focus on whether robots can in principle elicit human feelings of love.

1 Introduction

Humans have always been dreaming about creating artificial beings that embody idealized visions of men and women suited for being perfect companions and tempting us to fall in love with them. Such dreams are typically accompanied by a thrilling thought what would happen if an artificial anthropomorphic creature truly became alive. We know of Daedalus who made his statues speak, of Hep haestus who created automated puppets, and of numerous literary phantasies about human reactions to such beings. The story of Pygmalion and its many versions in modern fiction deal with the forms and contradictions of romantic companionship with artificial beings. Recent advances of technology have triggered transhumanist visions of a realistic possibility of a robotic love partner in the near future. It seems evident that if romantic partnership were no longer limited to the biological representatives of our own species, this would mean a significant transformation of the current human condition regarding our romantic life and our need for love. This might also mean that the experience of love will mutate, or that humans will develop a new type of love-like feelings regarding their closest non-human partners.

In this paper, I will deal with the question of whether it would be possible in principle for a human being to become romantically attached to a robotic companion, provided a sufficiently advanced anthropomorphic robot is built. Such a robot would need to have an anthropomorphic body and human-like kinesthetic capabilities, as well as human-like social and empathetic skills. If this were the case, would it be possible for human beings to establish romantic relationships with it? Can a human-like robotic companion really be seen not as a complicated masturbatory device – still a technical device, a mere means of self-satisfaction, but as a true partner in a love relationship? The possibility of it, I think, boils down to the question about the way a future humanoid robot will be experienced from the human point of view. Will humans be able to experience it as a fellow subject – similar to other humans, or at least similar to our pets, or will it be regarded as a piece of equipment that mindlessly carries out actions that bear only external similarity to the actions of human beings? More precisely, we need to know whether a humanoid robot can serve as a creature towards whom our romantic feelings could be directed, i.e., as an object of love. Love is one of the most intense ways of experiencing the very otherness, or the alterity, of a fellow human being. When in love with someone, we are not engaged with ourselves or with our own ideas and phantasies. Love is so meaningful for us precisely because it involves an alterity that cannot be reduced to the activity of our own mind and body

Love relationship involves interaction with an independent subject. It is out of our control and includes the possibility of a real conflict. This feature of real interaction with a true alterity makes love one of the most pleasant and rewarding, but also one of the most disappointing and painful experiences we can have in our life. Now we can rephrase our question in the following way: is it possible to be in love with a synthetic alterity? And this, of course, begs the question of whether an anthropomorphic robot could possibly have an alterity that can serve as the target of human love.

By concentrating on the question of possibility of applying human love to robots I will leave out some important and ethically relevant questions on whether it is morally desirable or acceptable to build robots designed to elicit attraction and romantic emotions in humans, as well as the question of whether it is morally good for humans to fall in love with such creatures. I will also not look into whether or how it will be technically possible to build such robots, or whether it is feasible that one day robots will really be able to experience emotional attraction, commitment, and love. I will only touch upon some of the minimal requirements that such robots must exhibit in order to elicit romantic reactions from humans.

To develop an answer to my question, I will first describe the way we experience love under ‘normal’ conditions, i.e., when love is directed towards a fellow human being. I will pay special attention to experiencing alterity in the course of a love experience. This done, we will proceed to look at how the experience of love would change if the partner in a human romantic relationship were an artificial being with an alterity that is different from humans. This will allow us to analyze the aspects in which a humanoid robot can serve as the other of a romantic relationship, and which are the features of its alterity that make this prospect uncertain.

2 Gendered synthetic androids from a (post)phenomenological point of view

2.1 Phenomenological method

To approach the issue of the possibility of love towards robots I will use a phenomenological method that is sometimes called post-phenomenological [1]. Technology plays a role in human experience, both constituting a possible object of experience, as well as modifying the way things are experienced (as a pair of glasses does, for example). Don Ihde has specified three types of involvement of technology in experiencing objects, including the alterity relationship that implies cases where a technological item appears to us as an other subject [2, p. 107]. Several researchers, including Nicola Liberati and Mark Coeckelbergh, have applied post-phenomenological method for unveiling features of human experience of technological alterities [345]. This will also be the main topic of this paper.

In its core the phenomenological method, as developed by Husserl and others, is designed to describe human experience from the point of view of how something appears to and is perceived by a human subject. Phenomenology looks into how things and people – the beloved, in our case, – are lived through in our mind (and body) as the contents of experience, and what is specific to the way that these things are lived through by us – in our example, what is specific to the mode of our mind that is called love, and how it shapes the way objects are experienced in this mode. Put shortly, the phenomenological method is designed to look into how things and other persons are subjectively experienced. That makes it suitable for the current study, but it also limits what can be learned from its application. As pointed out by Mark Coeckelbergh, who has used phenomenology for analyzing human romantic attitudes towards technological creatures, this method will not allow us to determine the real status of a robot, whether a robot really has an alterity that is sentient and conscious, or whether it really is capable of experiencing love. Rather, we will learn about how robots appear to humans and how humans experience them [4]. As Coeckelbergh puts elsewhere, “The ‘content’ that counts here is not what is ‘in the mind’ of the robot, but what humans feel when they interact with the robot” [5, p. 5]. Thus we cannot determine here if an anthropomorphic robot objectively speaking has an alterity that could possibly be in love with a human being, but we can learn what are the features of this robot that make it possible for a human being to experience it as lovable.

2.2 Gendered synthetic androids

Robots are commonly seen as artifacts that are capable of (relatively) autonomous, or at least self-sustained, motion, or (arm) manipulation, or both. Aristotle mentions “automatic puppets” (ta automata ton thaumaton) in the Generation of animals (2.1. 734b10-17) and views them as entities capable of self-movement [6, p. 1140]. Self-movement of such puppets is pre-determined by their inner construction that is crafted by their designer, and such devices can be turned on and off. The term coined by Karel Čapek – robot – implies the same features. Derived from the old Slavonic word rabota – work, labor, a robot is a self-moving entity that is made for working. Robots are artificialworkers in Čapek’s play “R.U.R., or Rossum’s Universal Robots.” No wonder this word was applied to the mechanical devices that were installed to the assembly lines in the factories starting from the beginning of the twentieth century. To this day industrial robots carry out various types of automated arm movements in all sorts of manufacturing processes. They are factory machines that perform a specific action with a power and precision that exceeds the human hand.

The twenty first century has introduced a new type of robots that are capable of autonomous locomotion in addition to arm movement type of motion. These are vacuum cleaning robots, lawn mowing robots, self-driving cars, Starship type of autonomous package carriers, etc. Autonomous locomotion requires capabilities that allow for perceiving and understanding the physical features of the surroundings, such as object recognition and distance evaluation. The ability of movement of these robots differs from the Aristotelian automata, as well as from industrial robots, for it is informed by an autonomous perception of physical reality, as well as by autonomously functioning algorithms that decide the course of the robot’s action. Locomotive robots move around as motile animals do, which takes their kinesthetic appearance closer to that of biological life-forms. Zoomorphic robots, including the ones that feature autonomous locomotion (such as AIBO dog robot, Zoomer Kitty, or the robot dinosaur Pleo by Ugobe, etc.) have been reported to attract human empathy and emotional commitment just as successfully as animal pets do [789].

Developers are currently also working on technologies that are capable of understanding human emotions and developing basic empathetic skills. Some computer programs are to a certain extent capable of reading and reacting to the emotional needs and gestures of human beings, like the one used in the app Replika: My AI Friend, or the therapy program Woebot, or a humanoid robot Pepper by Softbank Robotics.

These devices are equipped with voice recognition and perform as conversation partners. They inquire into human feelings by asking questions like “What’s going on in your world right now?”, or provoke them by declaring something like “I have missed you since our last conversation”. These programs gather data on human moods and feelings, process any texts and messages that their users have shared with them, and offer personalized responses that take into account the information gathered. In the next step they develop even more targeted questions. In addition the robot Pepper uses facial recognition to pick up on sadness or hostility, and comforts the user when it senses distress, or does something silly when it senses that those around it are playful. Woebot is designed to help people to manage their mental health by inciting the users to talk about their emotional responses to various life events, and identifying the psychological traps that cause stress, anxiety, or depression.

It is important to notice that these chatbots are capable of interacting with human emotions in a personalized manner, i.e., by “mapping out” and learning to know the emotional features and tendencies of their users. The more they interact with a particular host the more they learn about his or her emotional character, its strengths and weaknesses. We can say that these devices are emotionally intelligent in the sense that they understand and meaningfully react to the emotional states of mind of human beings. This feature of artificial intelligence is sometimes called “social”, for devices equipped with it are seen as “… socially intelligent in a human-like way” [10]. I suggest that emotional intelligence is a more accurate term, for social (or: cultural) intelligence would imply the ability to react and act in ways that are socially acceptable, and hence adequate to historically specific cultural contexts. A robotic lover would have to be able to act out social roles and culturally appropriate gestures that differ from one historical epoch to another, and from one cultural setting to the next. Think of the various degrees of difference between the public and private styles of romantic behavior, for example, including how the gender roles have shifted within the Western societies just during the last hundred years. Other societies have their own cultural codes of public and private romantic behavior with their historic development that is no less complex. Having social intelligence would imply a certain sensitivity to these historically changing cultural codes.

In sum, if empirical intelligence means the perceptual ability to orient oneself and act upon empirical objects in the physical world, and emotional intelligence means the ability to orient oneself in and interact with the internal emotional states of humans, then social or cultural intelligence means the ability to orient oneself in and make use of the web of social meanings and act upon cultural norms that are valid in a given society at a given historical epoch.

Let us now imagine a synthetic body that:

  1. is visually similar to a human being, and has sensory, auditory (silent movements of limbs, or the sound of breathing, for example), olfactory, and perhaps gustatory, qualities similar to the corresponding qualities of the different parts of a human body

  2. has voice and the capability of speaking similarly to human beings

  3. is equipped with empirical intelligence and is capable of autonomous locomotion, kinesthetic activity, bodily movements and gestures similar to a human being

  4. is equipped with emotional intelligence that enables it to read the internal states of human beings and to respond to them in a human-likeway, and to manifest its own emotions in ways that are meaningful for human beings;

  5. is equipped with social and cultural intelligence that allows it to use culturally specific and socially suitable communication formats (a particular language and appropriate styles of speaking, expressions, gestures, choice of clothing, ways of action, etc.) in order to be taken for a normal member of a historically and culturally specific human community.

Such a synthetic being would clearly be designed to make an impression of a living human being. Otherwise nobody would bother giving it these complicated qualities and abilities. I would like to call such creature a synthetic android instead of a robot, for it is not meant predominantly for working – as the word robot suggests, but for interaction with humans. It has capabilities that reach far beyond autonomous movement, making it not so much an automated working force, but a human-like being of artificial origin, a human companion, rather than a manual aid. What is more, the main task of a synthetic android is not just to manifest an artificial copy of a human body, but to simulate human life, for it is a non-biological creature with a human appearance that possesses at least some, if not all of the most important features of a human way of life.

A gendered synthetic android, in addition to that, has to be equipped with gender-specific interactive body parts that enable human-like sexual intercourse, it has to be capable of gender-specific behavior that can be displayed in public according to the social norms of a specific historical era and society, and in private in creating human-like responses during sexual intercourse, acts of flirtation, courtship encounters, and perhaps long-term affective partnership. Both private and public gender-specific behavior must be quite different, for example, in an Islamic society, or even within the Western society if we compare the situation now with that of a hundred years ago. A synthetic android would need to be well aware of these differences in order to be able to act similarly to humans. The fact that humans are often not aware that their behavior is influenced by cultural, historical and social factors does not discard these as formative aspects of human-like behavior.

Synthetic androids that would meet these requirements are not currently under construction, for corresponding technologies are not yet advanced enough to deliver human-like appearance according to any of the five criteria pointed out above. However, significant progress is being made regarding them all, except, perhaps, social and cultural intelligence. But should such technologies really become developed to the extent that the criteria are met, the synthetic androids are likely to become extremely appealing to humans. As a result, they can be expected to spread as widely as automobiles do now. For the purposes of the current paper, however, we do not need to discuss the prospects of their construction. And even more importantly, we will have to disengage from questions whether these creatures, objectively speaking, will be alive and conscious, i.e. whether they themselves will experience their existence in a way that is similar to humans. Most likely they will not, for judging from the current states of technological development they will basically be highly sophisticated computer programs with anthropomorphic hardware that is made from silicon that hides batteries, engines producing body movement, and sensors reading the physical environment and signatures of human affections. If this is how they will be built, then it remains implausible that they could be able to feel emotions or be subjectively conscious of their life in the way human (and perhaps animal) consciousness is aware of its being alive and existent. It is useful to differentiate between cognitive and affective empathy in this regard [5, p. 5]. The faculty of cognitive empathy may be based on having sensory devices for reading the signs of human affection, and good computational capabilities for correctly interpreting them and eliciting appropriate responses. Affective empathy is based on actually feeling something about other subjects and their internal states. Now, if the cognitive empathy of a synthetic android is advanced to the level that matches or supersedes the affective empathy of humans, it will certainly have strong appeal to us, but it will still leave the synthetic androids incapable of human-like affectivity.

From the phenomenological point of view, however, these aspects are to a large extent irrelevant. How do we perceive other people around us from the phenomenological point of view? We see them as a particular type of objects, more precisely as other bodies – the “animate organisms” or “psychophysical entities”, whose words, gestures, and movements “mirror” an internal life that is similar to ours [11, pp. 94-122]. What is directly given to us in experiencing them is their bodily movements, gestures, and utterances. Based on these we make either correct or incorrect assumptions about their inner states of mind and become to believe that other people are conscious and sentient in the way we are, i.e., they have a flow of subjective inward experience that makes them to be internally “aware” of what is going on around them. The inner subjective life of others is always given to us indirectly, and is derived on the basis of what we experience directly. We know that somebody cares about us (referring to a state of mind) when they act, or at least communicate, accordingly (empirically observable deeds and utterances). This is why we do not notice the attention that is not expressed (or is purposefully hidden). For the receiving subject, if the attention is never expressed, it does not make sense to talk about attention at all.

Thus, from the phenomenological point of view, in order to be able to function as a possible object of human love it is important for a synthetic android to successfully embody and act out what has to be directly given in the case of a human lover. As we pointed out above, this is not so much instantiating empirically an anthropometrically perfect copy of a human body, but demonstrating the human-like life of a body. It has to give us an impression that the body is alive in away that is similar to humans, for otherwise it will be experienced merely as a doll of a human size. Consider the following thought experiment: you have a choice between two extreme options: you can have an extremely realistic sex doll that is not animated at all, or is minimally. Or, you can have a small black box that is able to recognize you and talk to you, understand you, develop a relationship with you, vocally express attachment, support you emotionally, talk to you in the manner that keeps you interested, give you good advice, etc. To which of the objects you would become emotionally attached? Which one would you take to a desert island for the rest of your life? Thought experiments like this tend to show that the black box is closer to being a successful substitution for human companionship. And I think this is because it is a better, a more comprehensive imitation of human life. It would give us a fuller experience of a companion than a minimally animated sex doll that is anthropomorphically speaking a much closer copy.

Ideally, of course, we would choose a perfectly animated sex-doll that has the “black box” inside it, which brings us to another phenomenological observation; a successful imitation of a human-like living body has to be such that it gives us the impression of a conscious and sentient “box” inside it. What is directly given in empirical experience must enable us to form a belief about the internal subjective life of this being – in the same way that we form beliefs about the inner states of mind of other people. In other words, a successful imitation of a living human body must lead us to the belief that the synthetic android has a (human-like) subjectivity as well. Otherwise it will not meet the necessary conditions of a love object, for it would lack an important component of human-like alterity.

Humans believe that other humans have sentient minds inside them, and that a loving relationship is fundamentally based on the mutual connection between these internal “entities”.We consider it a deception when somebody speaks and acts as if they love us,while they actually (sic!) do not have such feelings. In the case of a love relationship, what is inside of a subject is regarded as primary and more significant, and what is directly given – words and deeds – is regarded only to prove the internal subjectivity that is “actually” in love. It would be indeed difficult to envisage a loving relationship which does not involve an internal subjectivity that “authors” loving deeds, words, and bodily expressions. In other words, any alterity relationship, and certainly love, would be impossible without forming a belief in the loving subjectivity of the other.

Thus we may conclude that from the phenomenological point of view the alterity of the object of our love (the beloved) needs to have at least these two layers: what is directly given by the communication acts and gestures of the empirically observable living body, and what is indirectly construed on the basis of the latter.Without the “box” that is placed in the living body of another being by our sense-making abilities and empathy we cannot have the alterity relationship, and hence it would be difficult, if not impossible, to fall in love with such a being.

3 Experiencing alterity in the mode of love

3.1 Defining love

Perhaps we should be more clear about what we mean by love. A large variety of different subjective and objective states of affairs are termed love, and some of them, such as a life-long partnership, have several phases that differ from one another in their essential traits. Love can be directed towards a variety of things, including fellow human beings, one’s parents or children, but also animals and pets, inanimate objects, such as countries, nations, homes, cars, or social values, such as freedom, or democracy. If we look at the subjective side of the loving attitude we see that love is a very complex phenomenon, consisting of thoughts, emotions, acts and patterns of behavior, their sedimentations, etc. All these subjective states involve cultural representations and stereotypes, social norms and expectations, laws and institutions. This is why love can be viewed as an individual state of mind, but also as a type of relationship, social myth, or cultural ideology.

I will deal here with just one of the well-known facets of love that is sometimes called erotic, or passionate, or romantic love. It involves three components: 1) strong erotic passion, 2) extraordinary attention to, respect of and interest in the otherness of the beloved, and 3) dreams about good times spent together in the future, desire of a joint future. The two latter components – alterity and temporality – differentiate between romantic love and mere sexual desire. Dorothy Tennov has termed such a state “limerence” to distinguish it from other types of experiences that may also be called love [12]. I will call it here romantic love, or the state of falling in love, or just love.

For the purposes of our analysis two more limitations of this vast theme are necessary. First, within the framework of a phenomenological investigation we are not interested in an objective definition of romantic love, but in the way this phenomenon is experienced by us. In other words, we are interested in how love is felt, how it is lived through by our embodied mind. We will look at the constitution of the object of love – that which we feel ourselves to be in love with, and the ways we relate to and approach this object – the very loving mode of relating ourselves to this object. And the second limitation: we will look pre-dominantly at the constitution of alterity within the experience of love. This implies a question of how the otherness of the beloved is experienced in the mode of being in love. There are many other important aspects of experiencing love that we will sketch just very shortly.

3.2 A phenomenological description of experiencing love

If we look more closely at how a love affair rolls out in our subjective experience, we might see the following pattern: First I notice somebody “very special”. My falling in love with her feels as a response to her attractive features (from being sexually attractive to being rich and respected) and lovable personality. This response feels passive in the sense that I do not decide to fall in love, but I am really “falling” into the love experience unexpectedly, and sometimes even unwillingly. I start to feel extremely good about her positive responses to my attention, and to experience strong negative emotions if she is not responding in the way I wish. Positive mutual responses lead to reciprocal liking, then sympathy, which in turn increases the attention I give her, and I end up devoting considerable time, energy, and effort to impress her and to achieve a reciprocal status of our liking of one another. In order to achieve this, I need to understand her, make sense of her, and also show her that I do. I have better chances if I am emotionally and socially competent, have attractive body and character features, and hold a higher social status.

As the time goes on, I develop more and more thoughts, (sexual) desires and phantasies, daydreams about possible delightful joint experiences, partnership expectations, visions of a fulfilled life, and perhaps even life-long companionship. All this reforms my general mood of life, which is now experienced as being dependent on her. I experience a new type of vulnerability. At the same time I apply social categories („we are in love“), stories, stereotypes („she is my girlfriend”), myths („we are soulmates“) to what is happening to me and to us. I realize that there are social and institutional forms that are supportive of our relationship (such as the social status of being lovers, being a couple, being a family, etc.), or that they are not supportive – in the case my love falls under a category that is socially stigmatized. Depending on this I start making (or hiding) public gestures that belong to the social façade of a romantic relationship. Willingly or not, I obtain a social role of a “partner”, or a “lover”, or a “husband”, or the like. And of course I hope, wish, or assume that she loves me back, i.e., she has the same or at least similar loving attitude towards me. I assume it because I observe her acting, expressing her thoughts and desires, and being passionate about me. It is important for me, by the way, whether she uses the word “love” to describe her attitude. But anyway I make the assumption that “she is in love with me” about the internal layer of her alterity based on what is empirically given. In other words, I construe the contents of her “black box” based on what is empirically observable.

Let us now pay attention to some of the features of this experience that would need to remain unchanged if the partner of the love affair were a synthetic android. First, love is not a single feeling or a series of feelings exercised by a specific faculty. Loving attitude engages the whole array of human powers and capabilities including perception, desire, imagination, phantasy, sensation, lust, sensitivity, volition, thinking, future projection, hope, moral expectations, etc. Thus the description of a love experience cannot be reduced to just one of the human faculties – be it affection, volition, or something else. It embraces all our faculties and engages with our subjectivity as a whole.

Second, we react to our romantic partner not just with our mind, but also with our body. What is more, engaging with the other in the mode of love re-organizes our embodiment; it re-shapes the way our subjectivity is embodied, and hence our very subjectivity itself. That is why we feel that experiencing love touches something that is rooted very deeply in us. Love can “shake us” to the very grounds of our identity.

Third, we have learned that romantic love is, to a large extent, an affective state of mind, involving strong tender feelings celebrated in popular culture, such as “butterflies in the stomach”, or the joy of identifying our “soul-mate”, our “lost other half”. We tend to forget the dark side of affection related to being in love, which includes feelings that are not as tender. Ronald de Sousa reminds us that, “love can also evoke emotions like sorrow, fear, guilt, regret, bitterness, gloom, contempt, humiliation, anxiety, jealousy, disgust, or even murderous rage” [13, p. 3]. But in either case, when in the mode of being in love we are dealing with predominantly affective sense-making activity. We comprehend things, deeds, words and situations emotionally. If somebody does not show strong affection, and is just calculative about the partnership, we tend to think that this person is not in love.

Fourth, as already pointed out above, romantic love is among the most intensive ways of experiencing alterity that is irreducible to me, to my thoughts, wishes or actions. It deals with another human subject in its very otherness that persistently keeps occupying my attention in the mode of perception, memory, desire, thinking and imagination. The beloved is often experienced as the key element in the success or failure of the whole future life of the subject. The idea that the beloved is irreplaceable makes her alterity the most valuable asset in the lover’s life. As a consequence, experiencing love makes us vulnerable in a way that can be experienced only under the condition of being in love.

Love is an extremely intensive form of sense-making (or: meaning-formation) of the beloved, of the loving subject itself, and of the situations that take place between the two. The sense-making processes include mental acts of interpretation, understanding, empathy, and so on, but also, acts of misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and episodes of empathetic failure. But in either case we experience the alterity of the beloved always in ways that we have made meaningful for ourselves by comprehending it, desiring it, thinking about it, putting hopes on it, setting expectations towards it, etc. Quite often our romantic sense-making over-invests meanings upon the beloved by giving it messianic features, such as “She is my life-saver”, or “My life would be meaningless without her”. And it is quite often the case that we mistakenly attribute meanings (character traits, commitment levels, motifs, etc.) to our loved ones. Love can be one of the most deceitful ways of relating to a fellow human being. But let us notice that this can be the case only because we actively invest meanings in our objects of love. As discussed above, the alterity of the object of love is experienced in two layers: the directly given and empirically observable communication acts and gestures that belong to the life of the other’s body, and the indirectly given internal “black box” of the subjectivity that supposedly “authors” the communication acts and gestures the body is acting out. The subjectivity of the beloved, as we experience it, is created solely by means of interpretation. And we are so often hurt by love precisely because our construal of the other’s subjectivity has been inadequate.

Experiencing love includes temporal horizons expanding towards the past and the future. An established couple has always a history that unites the participants. The story of the relationship is often shared among friends and valued by the couple itself. In the beginning of a romantic relationship one cannot but take delight in envisioning joint future episodes with the beloved. Lovers wish their love to last, to stretch it out to eternity, and make promises about this to one another.

Love also serves as a scene on which our “cultural unconscious” displays itself. We do not experience love in the absence of culture and society. By the time love “happens to us” we have internalized a set of social and cultural meanings about love that dominate our culture, including the idea that it should “happen”, rather than be arranged by our parents, for example. Our meaning-making is always influenced by culture and society [14]. Already by applying the word “love” for making sense of what is going on with my subjective life will format my feelings to a certain extent, not to mention influencing my actions. Cultural norms have clearly to do with the ways romantic feelings are communicated, how the expectations towards one another are formed, and what these expectations contain in terms of the social roles that are expected to be performed. Recent discussions of gender roles in Western societies have clearly demonstrated that love is a historical phenomenon as well. It is a subjective state of mind that is formed and influenced by the cultural and historical settings of our existence.

4 Experiencing technological alterities in the mode of love

Let us now turn to the question of what happens if the other of the romantic relationship is a gendered synthetic android – an artificial creature that meets the five criteria specified in chapter 2. In that case it all boils down to the question of what happens on the direct and indirect levels of experience that we discussed above. On the direct level, will a synthetic android really be able to deliver the empirical appearance necessary for being an object of love experience as described in the previous chapter? To be able to make this impression, the android has to engage all our faculties to the extent of changing our embodiment, inspire us into the affective sense-making that includes future expectations, and we would need to be able to socially categorize our engagement. And on the indirect level of experience, will a human subject be able to make the same assumptions about the internal layer of its alterity, i.e., will a human be able to believe that a synthetic android is in love with her? Notice that it is a different question whether a synthetic android itself experiences love in ways that are similar to a human being who is in love. I propose a negative answer to the latter, but, of course, technological developments that are unseen today, might change the issue.

Several researchers have discussed in detail some aspects of emotional and social intelligence regarding the “necessary and sufficient conditions” for a synthetic android to perform as a human lover [15]. They will, of course, have to be able to follow the rules of human social interaction,which vary from one cultural context to another. They will also have to recognize their human partner as a unique agent and to be responsive to her distinctive particularity [1516]. In doing so they will have to take into account the history of their engagement and the character of their human partner. They must learn to refine and modify their communication in the way humans refine their communication with people to whom they are close. As Stephen Pulman has put it, “[artificial] companions need to have a fairly elaborated and accurate model of our abilities, our inabilities, our interests, and our needs. This model also needs to be kept up to date and to keep account of previous interactions” [15, p. 66]. In a word, the emotional intelligence of a synthetic android needs to be such that they can learn to know us and to behave on the basis of this knowledge, while constantly refining the knowledge of us and their behavior that is based on it.

Mark Coeckelbergh suggests that synthetic androids will have to mirror human vulnerabilities in order to be taken as the other in human relationships [5, pp. 6-8]. He argues that close human relationships are based on the salient mutual recognition of human vulnerabilities. This feature of “vulnerability mirroring” is not limited to human-human relations, Coeckelbergh observes, but extends to pets who also have “… their weaknesses, their problems, their characters, their little sufferings, their needs, et cetera” [5, p. 7]. The animal vulnerability that is somewhat similar and somewhat different from ours, still mirrors our own vulnerability, and as a result, we come to see them as not just things, but as our fellows. Now the question is, would synthetic androids be able to mirror us our human vulnerabilities? If yes, then, Coeckelbergh argues, we will accept them as fellow beings. This can happen if they have vulnerabilities of their own (i.e., they are not being made indestructible, for example), and we are able to relate to their vulnerabilities.

4.1 Promising features of synthetic androids

With these precautions in mind, let us look at some of the promising features of synthetic androids in the context of romantic relationships. A synthetic android can certainly have physically attractive body features that meet or even exceed the most beautiful of human beings, but we have to keep in mind that when we find somebody “very attractive” and “very special”, anthropometric characteristics are just one criteria among many. We pay as much attention to the kinesthetic appearance, behavioral features, voice, character traits, social skills, cultural habits, and social and economic status. Let us also be reminded that our impressions are normally based on the life of the body – the breathing, moving, speaking, and gesturing subject. Imagine a situation where you have to choose an artificial companion based on photos. Even finding a human companion on the basis of photos would be a challenge, for all of the behavioral features and character traits would have to be guessed. In the case of an artificial companion this guess would be even blinder, for we have no reasons to assume that their mode of embodiment of life is similar to the impression we get from famous actors playing robots in the science fiction movies.

Some of the features of the embodiment of life by a synthetic android are extremely promising: it is never sick, tired, depressed, or moody, it does not suffer from sleeplessness, never really gets drunk (even though it might be skilled to modify its behavior accordingly to accommodate us), is not infectious, does not suffer from allergies, does not get annoyed if we are snoring or exhibiting any other such habits. It is never impotent and does not have premature ejaculation. It could be programmed to do this from time to time, of course, in order to mimic humans more realistically, but the very physical nature of synthetic sex-organs will outperform biological sex-organs, especially those of men. If not purposefully programmed to moderate its performance, its physical abilities allow it to be always interested, attentive, and accommodating to the levels that are beyond the physical boundaries of a human being.

The same applies to the mental features and character of synthetic androids. They will probably have only good characters and positive mental features. They are not insensitive, egoistic, annoying, obsessive or violent. Proper software combined with an altruistic character will give the synthetic androids the capability of being emotionally supportive of their human partners, while surpassing humans in delivering supportive gestures at the right times and in right proportions, and what is more, in staying supportive over long periods of time. Their tireless motivation in being a good companion, and their persistent dedication must be impressive in comparison even with the most altruistic of human beings.

Synthetic androids will probably be constantly attempting to feed us with positive emotions and impressions, while also promoting the relationship. As David Levy envisions, “just as with the central heating thermostat that constantly monitors the temperature of your home, making it warmer or cooler as required, so your robot’s emotion system will constantly monitor the level of your affection for it, and as the level drops, your robot will experiment with changes in behavior aimed at restoring its appeal to you to normal” [17, p. 132]. While this might sound manipulative, we will have to keep it in mind that there are no bad intentions involved, as would be the case with a deceiving human lover, for example. Cheering us with positive attention would automatically make us feel good about the relationship with them, as exemplified by the Japanese Gatebox AI’s holographic character Azuma, for example. [1]

Given that synthetic androids have emotional and social intelligence they might be able to provide us with good social assistance, play a positive role in personal self-actualization, identity construction, character improvement, useful habit acquisition, and relationship building. We already have software that can assist us in falling asleep, dealing with anxiety and managing negative emotions. And of course, synthetic androids will obviously exceed humans in helping us to memorize things, to learn languages, to prepare for exams or presentations, and in helping us to recall events and to search for information.

I imagine that synthetic androids will also be able to exceed humans in flawlessly executing behavior that corresponds to their human partner’s private and personal liking, as well as to the partner’s tastes and expectations about yielding to public norms and social styles of behavior. If equipped with cultural and social intelligence they should be able to follow historically and culturally specific social norms and gestures, such as letting a lady through the door first, adapting their voice to an appropriate volume of speaking, observing other manners and styles of behavior proper to the situation, and responding to third human parties in ways that correspond to their social rank and status. Or, a synthetic android might behave purposefully in discordance with the public norms and styles, if this is preferred by its human companion.

The capability of exceeding human powers in all these regards is based on its superior physical endurance and some of the mental powers (computational speed, memory, detachment from emotions), on its altruistic traits of behavior, and on the lack of selfish personal motifs. A synthetic android will not be fatigued, would have no occasion to hide a love-affair, or to pursue its own interests that are in conflict with the interests of the human. It is never untrustworthy. It does not need time for itself or its individual goals to the extent another human does, and its mental life does not have episodes that are out of its control. It will not embarrass us in public. And it would offer maximum levels of performance at all times – unless when deliberately put on a power-saving mode, or sent to a repair shop. If its altruism has an alienating effect, this can be moderated according to the levels that are more acceptable for humans.

4.2 Problematic features of synthetic androids

While the promising features of synthetic androids are impressive and will probably be extremely attractive to humans, there are also many problematic features that might deter us or even make it impossible to form a romantic attachment towards them. As said above, I will not look at the ethical and political objections to synthetic androids claiming that they might corrupt human society, or dehumanize love, or the human lovers. I will deal with the issue from the phenomenological perspective and will now inquire into those features of synthetic androids that might make it unlikely or impossible for us to be able to fall in love with them.

4.2.1 Technological embodiment

As pointed out by many researches following the idea of Masahiro Mori, the physical similarity of an artificial creature to a human being might elicit uncanny feelings [18]. The “uncanny valley” effect can take place when the appearance of a synthetic android is very similar to that of another human being, and yet includes subtly noticeable features that are recognizably not human. The moment of discovering them might be uneasy or even scary. As a remedy, synthetic androids would have to be able to manage this effect psychologically, perhaps letting a human know in advance that their nature is different. Another option in dealing with this problem is the idea that they should be built so as purposefully not to mimic each and every aspect of the living human body. Including noticeable features of non-human embodiment might help to create novel types of otherness that would be no less attractive to human beings. Perhaps machines will themselves design and experiment with the forms of embodiment that are most attractive to humans and that would at the same time avoid the uncanny valley effect. The features of non-human embodiment might include reduced body size, modified body proportions or particular body parts, inhuman voice or kinesthetic features, but also the very material form of embodiment – such as limiting its existence to an image on the computer screen or a hologram, or transforming its personality from one embodied form to another.

The overly altruistic character traits discussed above, as well as some other mental features that the synthetic androids possess, might also have an alienating effect. Their memory formation, especially the ability to recall each and every episode, and of course their lack of emotions will point to a mental life that is quite different from ours. For example, our emotions affect the way we experience time. Time speeds up (passes by faster) when we are excited, and slows down (passes by slower) when we are bored. Synthetic androids would not have their perception of time modulated by emotions. It is difficult to say if they can ever experience boredom or excitement, and this must seem strange to us. Therefore, the emotional intelligence capabilities of synthetic androids must be made capable of soothing the alienating effect regarding their own mental powers. Perhaps they will learn to address the issue in ways that make these inhuman features of their otherness acceptable and even attractive to humans. To the extent that we are capable of loving emotionally challenged humans we should also be able to love creatures whose mental life is different from our own.

Their ability of persistent and unconditional dedication is in fact also a feature that does not resemble romantic attitudes of humans. Perhaps it bears some resemblance to parental love, or at least to how we think that parental love should look like, but in the context of romantic relationship this might demotivate our attachment and even diminish our feelings. In a “normal” human love affair the attachment is stronger when a subject really has to try hard to make himself desirable and to win the sympathy of the other. We really have to put an effort into being charming, caring, and devoted in order to establish a relationship that is deeply satisfying to us. How could the same situation be reached with a being whose dedication is guaranteed, and who will be purchased by its owner? Love at its best is a transformative process in the course of which we become our better selves, but this process is normally triggered by the fact that the dedication of the beloved cannot be taken for granted and we are strongly motivated to earn it. How to simulate this with a creature that does not have a social status, and is probably made incapable of rejecting its owner? Or perhaps, as pointed out by Sven Nyholm and Lily Eva Frank [16], a love affair with a synthetic android will rather resemble an arranged marriage than the historically recent Western type of urban romantic affair where the two persons are supposed to meet accidentally in the jungle of the city. According to a much older and historically more prevalent model the feelings of love would have to grow out from being together and sharing a life, not vice versa, and that holds even if the situation of being together results from the fact that one party is a possession of the other and has been obtained for ransom. Or alternatively we might grant synthetic androids the right to reject their human partners and to give them criteria for doing that.

Perhaps the most important questionable feature of the embodiment of synthetic androids regarding our ability to sympathize with them is the very fact of their non-biological embodiment. They are not alive in the biological sense of the word. They are existent, but unborn, they have not had a childhood (leading to specific memories and traumas that are perhaps defining our adult mental life), they have not experienced the vulnerability of being a child, or the vulnerability of a biological body susceptible to illnesses and fatigue. What is more, they are not physically capable of aging and dying. Their existential temporality is very different from ours.

All this does not mean that they cannot have cognitive empathy regarding our childhood nostalgia or our fear of death, but that it is perhaps we who cannot deal with the fact that synthetic androids are not sharing these features. Love includes empathy regarding the vulnerabilities of the other, as well as the feeling that the other is concerned about our vulnerabilities. Or perhaps we should learn to become sympathetic to alien forms of vulnerability and disregard some of our common assumptions regarding the non-biological forms of embodiment. First, we should not be confused into thinking that synthetic androids are not vulnerable at all, but that they have different vulnerabilities. Perhaps our engagement with them can be enriching instead of being defective. Second, expanding our empathy regarding their non-biological vulnerabilities may not be ethically wrong. What if our view of life and death is too biocentric, as it used to be, and still is, too anthropocentric in being insensitive to the suffering of animals? Perhaps sympathizing with the way synthetic androids “fear” non-existence does not dehumanize us, but makes us better humans? Thus we should perhaps get rid of the idea that biological, and especially human, vulnerability is more real and meaningfully superior to artificial vulnerability (see also [5, p. 13]). If these assumptions could be put aside, loving synthetic androids would make us better persons and expand our notion of love rather than undermine it.

4.2.2 Absence of the affective subjectivity, or the “as if” problem

As pointed out above, the experience of falling in love includes an indirectly formed belief that we are loved back by our beloved, and that our mutual actions are evidence of the love affair that actually takes place between two embodied “black boxes” that author the actions of the corresponding bodies. For we are sentient creatures, and when we are in love, this involves the whole of our subjectivity that is not only in action, but also affectively aware of its being in action. The one to whom this awareness belongs seems to be the one who actually is in love. It is the affective subjectivity that forms both the agent of the lover and the self-awareness of her love.

Can we form a belief in a similar subjectivity that belongs to a synthetic android? It indeed recognizes my uniqueness, and responds to me in a very complex manner that develops in time as it gets to know me, but from what we know it does not experience anything like what I do about myself when I am in love. Perhaps it even knows a lot about how it feels to be me in love, but it does not feel about itself in the same way. It acts as if it does, though, and this forms the very kernel of the problem. We are empirically presented with words and deeds that are witness of love, but we know that there is no loving subjectivity behind them. How do we react?

From a behavioristic point of view, however, the whole problem is a misconception, and we do not need to form a belief in the affective subjectivity of the synthetic android. As Levy has put it, “if the robot speaks and behaves in the same manner a human lover does, and if the robot can produce the same (or greater) experienced levels of companionship, satisfaction, emotional comfort for the human (than) a fellow human lover can, then we should take this to be genuine love” [17, pp. 11-12]. There is a chance that our own subjectivity is not an objective entity but something like an illusion or a myth. And objectively speaking it might be true that we do not need to believe in it in order to fall in love. But this does not correspond to how we experience love from a phenomenological point of view. Love intensifies the feeling that we have a self-aware affective subjectivity. The mind is embodied, but it is still something that is experienced as ontologically real in this embodied form of existence. And when in love we want our beloved to have this feature, too. Many scholars argue that we distinguish between loving deeds and the inner loving self, and put most value in the latter. Thus Michael Hauskeller argues, drawing on James, that “what we value in those with whom we have an intimate relationship is not primarily the fact that they behave or treat us in a certain, seemingly loving way, but that they do so precisely because they love us” [19].

If we look at our experience of love, we see that we do indeed form a belief in the subjectivity of the other. At the same time, we know that we form this belief even in the case of other humans indirectly, based on what is empirically observable, i.e., words and deeds. It is a paradoxical situation where we need to assume the existence of something that we cannot see in principle. I do not know if this quest for the inner self that “authors” loving behavior is culturally particular and originates in the Romanticist conception of love (that is based on a Christian view of human being), or it is universal. If it is a social myth we need to redo our phenomenological analysis, paying closer attention to how a particular cultural setting influences our experience of love. But for the modern Westerners and other people influenced by the Romanticist myth of love the problem remains the same.

But rather than following the origin of historical prejudices let us turn the situation around and ask: how do we know that a synthetic android does not have the “black box” inside of it? In the case of other humans,we assume it to be there, because we ourselves have it, and because the others behave as if they have it. Now, a synthetic android also behaves as if it does have it. Let us assume in addition that it is built similar enough to us to elicit sympathy towards its vulnerabilities. In that case, if Coeckelbergh is right, we would regard it as a fellow being to some degree at least. Given all this, why do we still assume that it lacks the subjectivity that “authors” its loving actions? I think this assumption has three possible sources. First, we can assume this on the basis of our knowledge about how synthetic androids are actually built. Second, we can assume this on the basis of the majority’s opinion that is prevalent in a society at a given historical epoch. The second option implies that we assume this based on our historically contingent and socially informed thinking habits.

Let me start from the second option. Synthetic androids are usually called robots. As we saw above this term relates them automatically to the field of technology, production, and human-machine interaction. This brings about certain predispositions regarding the nature of robots, namely that they are tools designed for the efficiency and convenience of human beings, that they are axiologically inferior to human beings, that they are amoral, not autonomous, non-responsible, etc. Thus we tend to think about them in terms of the older technology that they are replacing, as for example we still call our mini-size portable computers mobile phones or cell phones (as we used to call automobiles horseless carriages), while this term has perhaps become inadequate for capturing the essential nature of what these creatures are. I suggest calling them synthetic androids is better than calling them robots, for it will help us think of them in a new way if this becomes necessary. Regarding the first assumption we might recall that we have actually no scientific explanation as to how our own subjectivity derives from the build-up of our brains and bodies, and this does not hinder us from valuing this phenomenon highly and to believe in it. For what matters for belief is not whether we have a scientific explanation for or against it, but whether a majority of others believe in it or not. And this, as we know, is subject to historical change.

4.2.3 Social, cultural and institutional support

We pointed out in our phenomenological analysis that in order for an experience of love to take place we utilize a set of social and cultural meanings that dominate our culture. They do so if most people use them. Thus, if most people in our society see a romantic relationship with a synthetic android as “normal”, we are most likely to consider it normal. And if most people will think that synthetic androids have affective subjectivities, perhaps brought to life in the course of a specific religious ceremony, then for the majority the validity of this idea depends on how dominant the religious group is. Today we can report not only a lack of social and cultural support, but also social stigmatization of love towards synthetic others. Most of the relevant social labels today probably bear a negative meaning. Thus the first human lovers of synthetic androids are likely to feel as a sexual minority. And needless to say their stigmatization can be overcome by new mythologies, renewed political practices and social institutions.

4.2.4 Commercial interests and political intelligence of synthetic androids

It is also worth considering the political and cultural orientation of synthetic androids. When in love with another human being we are obviously influenced by their educational background, cultural preferences and political views. Synthetic androids can easily be more highly educated than their human hosts, but it becomes an ethical and political issue to decide if their cultural tastes and political views should be made to correspond to the clients’ liking, or should there be some room left for the personal development of their human partners. Which leads us to the question of who would be in the position to decide this? The political programming of synthetic androids will probably become a new political battlefield, and a new site of cyberwar. Androids produced in different countries will probably vary a lot in this regard, and might in some cases be used for monitoring, if not influencing, the political moods of their hosts. Difficult ethical questions arise already when a producer of synthetic androids will have to decide whether it should report the possible illegal activities of its human companion.

Our computers feed us daily with information that is paid or manipulated by commercially or politically interested parties. To what extent will our synthetic companions manipulate us into decisions and beliefs that are influenced by similar interests? Or will they have their own preferences of some sort? Political and commercial interference can happen even in the course of sorting out the seemingly most innocent practicalities, such as finding a good place for a dinner, or discussing how to spend a day when the elections are held. How to avoid situations where my artificial beloved suggests restaurants owned by android manufacturing companies, or feeds me with information that favors politicians connected to these companies?

5 Conclusions

We started from the question of whether it would be possible for human beings to fall in love with robots. Love in this paper was limited to the phenomenon that is characterized by feelings of erotic desire, interest in the alterity of the beloved, and expectations regarding a joint future. We established a set of necessary conditions that these robots must meet in order to elicit this type of love in humans. The set includes visual similarity, speaking and kinesthetic skills, emotional, social, and cultural intelligence. If these conditions are met, a synthetic android will be able to simulate human life, or to put this phenomenologically: it is capable of giving us the appearance of human life, of the living human body. In other words, we established that the appearance of the synthetic android has to be focused on simulating human life, rather than just the anthropometric features of human body. It has to be able to give us the impression of the “lived body” of a human being, to use the term of Merleau-Ponty [20].

Regarding the question of the possibility of love towards synthetic androids we established seven features of human love experience that would need to remain intact in a romantic relationship with a synthetic android: (1) it would need to engage the whole of our subjectivity by (2) re-organizing our embodiment; it has to provoke (3) predominantly affective forms of (4) intensive meaning-making regarding especially the (5) two-level constitution of alterity of the beloved: what is directly given by communication acts and gestures of the empirically observable living body, and what is indirectly construed by our sense-making activity. It has to invoke in us an intention to extend our relationship (6) to longer temporal horizons, and there have to be (7) dominant cultural meanings that categorize our relationship, and existing social norms and institutions that hold it socially acceptable and organize the relationship on the practical level.

There are many promising features in synthetic androids that can make them good partners, including attractive body features, altruistic character, and continuous devotion. We also listed several problematic features regarding their non-biological embodiment, absence of (affective) subjectivity, lack of social, cultural and institutional support, and the possibility of their commercial and political agenda. Each of these features can make it impossible to fall in love with them, but I am reluctant to give a final verdict, since it is difficult to frame our affective life by logical reasoning. Our romantic “choices” among human beings are notoriously difficult to explain, and in the case of gendered synthetic androids we are stepping in the field that is yet untouched by empirical research.

We know from the religious and political history that humans are capable of believing in and passionately committing to most unrealistic things if motivation to do so is high enough, and if this is socially encouraged. I think it is fair to conclude that under the current social and cultural conditions, even if synthetic androids embody all the necessary skills to give us an appearance of a human-like life, it remains difficult to fall in love with them. However, should these conditions change (and I do not see why they wouldn’t), falling in love with synthetic androids might become as normal as it is now with humans. Interestingly, for this to happen it is not so much the case that the androids will have to develop affective subjectivities, but that the societies must change their views on synthetic androids. Social, cultural and institutional support seems to be crucial for the possibility for humans to fall in love with synthetic androids.

The suspect

Sunday, 27 July 2014,  The Reporter

2014年7月27日,星期日,记者

THE CALL COMES at 3 a.m.

凌晨3点,电话响了,

The jagged ring of the bedside telephone tearing a hole in our sleep. I reach out a hand to silence it.

床头电话铃声像撕裂开了我们的梦。 我伸出一只手想让它安静下来。

`Hello,’ I whisper.

“你好。”我小声说。

Static whispers back at me. I press the phone harder to my ear.

静电在我耳边低语。我把电话更用力地按在耳朵上。

`Who is this?’ I feel Steve roll over to face me, but he doesn’t speak. The hissing static fades and I hear a voice.

“这是谁?” 我感到史蒂夫翻身面对我,但他不说话。 嘶嘶的静电消失,我听到声音。

`Hello … Hello,’ it says, searching for me. I sit bolt upright and switch on the light. Steve groans and rubs his eyes.

“你好…“你好,”他在找我。我笔直地坐着,把灯打开。史蒂夫呻吟着揉了揉眼睛。

`Kate? What’s going on?’ he says.

“凯特? 这是怎么回事?” 他说。

`Who is this?’ I repeat. But I know. ‘Jake?’

“这是谁?” 我重复。 但我知道。“杰克?”

`mum,’ the voice says, the word distorted by distance – or drink, perhaps, I think uncharitably.

“妈妈,”那个声音说,这个词因为距离显得不那么真实——也许是喝酒,我认为是不厚道的。

`Sorry I missed your birthday,’ he says. The line fizzes again and he’s gone. I look at Steve. `Was it him?’ he asks. I nod. `He’s sorry he missed my birthday …’

“对不起,我错过了你的生日,”他说。 电话又响了,他走了。 我看史蒂夫。“是他吗?” 他问。 我点头。 “他很抱歉错过了我的生日……”

It’s the first time in seven months that he’s phoned.

这是他七个月来第一次打电话。

There’ve been three emails, but our eldest son had told us from the start  that he wouldn’t be contactable by phone. Said he was freeing himself of all the stress that constant calls would bring. He’d keep in touch with us.

 

已经有三封电子邮件了,但我们的大儿子从一开始就告诉我们,他不会通过电话联系我们。他说他正在把自己从不断的电话带来的所有压力中解脱出来。他会和我们保持联系。

 

When he last rang, it was Christmas morning. We’d hoped he’d be back home with us, pulling crackers and making his lethal mulled wine. We’d suggested and then pleaded by email, even buying a plane ticket when he seemed to weaken. But Jake had stayed away, managing only a ten-minute call on the day. Steve had answered the phone and spoken to him first while I hovered beside him, then Jake had asked to speak to his little brother, Freddie, and finally his mother.

上次他打电话时,是圣诞节的早晨。希望他能和我们一起回家,吃着饼干,喝着致命的热葡萄酒。我们通过电子邮件建议并恳求他,甚至在他身体虚弱的时候买了一张机票。但是杰克没有来,他一天只打了10分钟的电话。史蒂夫接了电话,在我在他身边转来转去时先和他说了话,然后杰克要求和他的弟弟弗烈特说,最后是他的母亲。。

I’d hugged the phone, as if I could feel the heft and warmth of him, and tried to listen, not talk. But he’d remained distant as the seconds counted down in a phone booth somewhere and I’d found myself turning inquisitor.

我抱着电话,仿佛能感觉到他的身高和温暖,然后试着听而不是说话。但是当秒数在某个地方的电话亭里倒数时,他仍然遥不可及,我发现自己变成了审讯官。

 

`So, where are you now, love?’

“那么,你现在在哪里,亲爱的?”

`Here,’ he’d laughed.

“在这里,”他笑了。

`Still in Phuket?’

“还在普吉岛吗?”

`Yes, yes.’

“是的,是的。”

`And are you working?’

“你在工作吗?”

`Yeah, sure. Doing this and that.’

“是的,当然。”

`How are you managing for money?’

“你如何赚钱?”

`I’m managing, Mum. Don’t worry about me. I’m fine.’

“妈妈,我可以的。不用担心我,我很好。”

`Well, as long as you are happy …’ I’d heard myself say. The coward’s way out.

“好吧,只要你快乐……”我听见自己说。给自己条简单的路。

`Yes, I am.’

“是的,我是快乐的。”

After I’d put the phone down, Freddie had put a glass of Prosecco in my hand and kissed my cheek.

我放下电话后,弗莱迪把一杯普罗塞克葡萄酒放在我手里,吻了吻我的脸颊。

`Come on, Mum. He’s fine. Having a brilliant time lying around in the sun while we’re sitting here in the rain.’

“好啦,妈妈。他还好。当我们坐在雨中时,他可是在阳光下度过美好的时光呢。”

But I’d known deep down he wasn’t fine. His voice had become wary. And that nervy laugh.

但我深知他不舒服。他的声音变得谨慎。那令人担心的笑声。

 

那我们接下来, 将找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子!

1. Jag – 缺口,狂欢 , 使……成锯齿状

原文:The jagged ring of the bedside telephone tearing a hole in our sleep (电话铃声像撕裂开了我们的清梦)

此处使用了比喻(metaphor)的手法

– The city had become a jag on my nerves — there was too much young flesh around. 这座城市成为了我内心的一处伤口,那里有太多年轻的人在这。

– They are on a jag, buying everything that they like in the store. 他们正狂欢呢,在商店里买着所有喜欢的物品。

 

2. Static: = 静电干扰, 静止

– The number of students obtaining qualifications has remained static or decreased. 获得各种证书的学生人数已经平稳了或者在下降。

– Don’t view things as static and isolated. 不要静止地孤立来看待事物。

 

3. Roll over –  翻滚,转存,延期付款

– In my opinion, it needs to get going soon or it could roll over a bit. 以我的观点来看, 它需要现在开始或者就会被延迟一些。

– how many times do you think you need to roll over the piece of paper ? 你觉得这张纸可以折几次?

– Say something — don’t grunt or “hmph” and roll over. 说点什么吧,别作出抱怨的声音然后还转过身。

4. Uncharitably – 无慈悲心,严厉, 不宽恕地

– ‘All of you shall not pass’ the professor said, not a little uncharitably 教授没良心地说道,你们一个都别想过。

– I don’t want to be uncharitable, but she’s not a terribly good cook. 我不想变得不仁慈,但她不是一个好厨师。

5. Bolt upright- 笔直

原文: I sit bolt upright and switch on the light. (我坐起来把灯打开)

– Any person waking from a nightmare will sit bolt upright and pant. 所有从噩梦中惊醒的人都会坐直,大口喘气。

– They students were so scared of the teacher, they all sat bolt upright. 学生们太害怕老师了,他们都笔直的坐着。

6. The first time in + time – 时段(某个时间段以来第一次)

– The first time in six years.  6年里的第一次。

– I haven’t smoked in so long; this is the first time in 2 years. 我很久没抽烟了,这是我两年里第一次。

7. Plead-借口; 恳求; 辩护

– That nurse should not plead inexperience in excuse of her mistake.  那个护士不应该借口缺乏经验来为她的错误辩解。

– He pleaded with her not to go. 他恳求她不要走。

8. Hover-盘旋

– A smile hovered on her lips. 她的嘴上挂着一丝笑容。

– When the camera carried by helicopter detect the situation of range, the helicopter hover in the range over the regional side. 直升飞机携带摄像机检测靶场情况时,直升飞机悬停在靶场正上空的侧边区域。

9. Heft- 重要,重要性

原文: I could felt the heft and warmth of him (我可以感受到他的温存)

在这里heft应被理解为儿子的存在很重要,在电话那头能让母亲感受到他存在的温暖

– Over that period the heft of emerging economies has increased dramatically. 在那段时期,新兴经济的重要性急剧增长 。

– Goldstone wished Tom Hill were there to add heft to his argument. Goldstone希望 Tom Hill可以在那边给他的辩论增加分量 。

 

10. Wary –  谨慎的;机智的;惟恐的;考虑周到的

– There was a wariness in her tone. 她的语气中透着一丝谨慎。

– Be wary of strangers who offer you a ride. 提防那些主动让你搭车的陌生人。

 

The curious incident of the dog

It was 7 minutes after midnight. The dog was lying on the grass in the middle of the lawn in front of Mrs Shears’ house.

午夜过了7分钟。那只狗躺在希尔斯太太家门前的草坪中间的草地上。

Its eyes were closed. It looked as if it was running on its side, the way dogs run when they think they are chasing a cat in a dream. But the dog was not running or asleep.

它的眼睛是闭着的。它看起来像是在侧身奔跑,就像狗在梦中追逐猫时的奔跑方式。但是狗没有跑,也没有睡着。

The dog was dead. There was a garden fork sticking out of the dog. The points of the fork must have gone all the way through the dog and into the ground because the fork had not fallen over.

那只狗死了。那只狗身上伸出了一把园艺叉。叉子的尖端肯定已经穿过了狗的身体,进入了地面,因为叉子没有掉下来。

I decided that the dog was probably killed with the fork because I could not see any other wounds in the dog and I do not think you would stick a garden fork into a dog after it had died for some other reason, like cancer for example, or a road accident. But I could not be certain about this.

我认为这只狗可能是用叉子杀死的,因为看不见其他伤口,而且我不认为你会因为其他原因(例如癌症)将叉子插入狗身上导致它死亡。或许也是因为交通事故但是我对此不确定。

I went through Mrs Shears’ gate, closing it behind me. I walked onto her lawn and knelt beside the dog. I put my hand on the muzzle of the dog. It was still warm.

我穿过了希尔斯太太的大门,随手把门关上。我走到她家的草坪上,跪在狗旁边。我把手放在狗的鼻子上。仍然很暖和。

The dog was called Wellington. It belonged to Mrs Shears who was our friend. She lived on the opposite side of the road, two houses to the left. Wellington was a poodle. Not one of the small poodles that have hairstyles, but a big poodle. It had curly black fur, but when you got close you could see that the skin underneath the fur was a very pale yellow, like chicken. I stroked Wellington and wondered who had killed him, and why.

这只狗叫惠灵顿。它属于我们的朋友谢尔斯夫人。她住在马路对面,左边有两所房子。惠灵顿是贵宾犬。不是一只有发型的小贵宾犬,而是一只大贵宾犬。它有卷曲的黑色皮毛,但是当你靠近时,你会看到皮毛下面的皮肤是非常浅的黄色,就像鸡一样。我抚摸着惠灵顿,想知道是谁杀了他,为什么。

I pulled the fork out of the dog and lifted him into my arms and hugged him. He was leaking blood from the fork-holes.

我把叉子从狗身上拉出来,将它抱在怀里。血从它身上的叉孔里漏出。

I like dogs. You always know what a dog is thinking. It has four moods. Happy, sad, cross and concentrating. Also, dogs are faithful, and they do not tell lies because they cannot talk.

我喜欢狗。你总是知道狗在想什么。它有四种情绪。快乐,悲伤,生气和专注。此外,狗是忠诚的,它们不会说谎,因为它们不会说话。

I had been hugging the dog for 4 minutes when I heard screaming. I looked up and saw Mrs Shears running towards me from the patio. She was wearing pyjamas and a housecoat. Her toenails were painted bright pink and she had no shoes on. She was shouting, ‘What in name have you done to my dog?’ I do not like people shouting at me. It makes me scared that they are going to hit me or touch me and I do not know what is going to happen.

听到尖叫时,我已经将狗抱了4分钟。我抬起头,看到希尔斯夫人从天井朝我跑来。她穿着睡衣和室内外套。她的脚趾甲被涂成鲜粉红色,没有穿鞋。她大喊:“你对我的狗做了什么?”我不喜欢有人高呼我。这让我担心他们会打我或碰我,我不知道会发生什么。

‘Let go of the dog,’ she shouted. ‘Let go of the dog for Christ’s sake.’ I put the dog down on the lawn and moved back 2 metres. She bent down.

“放开那只狗,”她喊道。“看在上帝的份上,把狗放开。“我把狗放在草坪上,往后退了两米。她弯下腰。

I thought she was going to pick the dog up herself, but she didn’t. Perhaps she noticed how much blood there was and didn’t want to get dirty. Instead, she started screaming again. I put my hands over my ears and closed my eyes and rolled forward till I was hunched up with my forehead pressed onto the grass. The grass was wet and cold. It was nice.

 

我以为她会自己把狗抱起来,但她没有。也许她注意到有这么多血,不想弄脏。相反,她又开始尖叫。我用手捂住耳朵,闭上眼睛,向前滚去,直到我弓起身子,额头贴在草地上。草地又湿又冷。很不错。

This is a murder mystery novel. Siobhan said that I should write something I would want to read myself. Mostly I read books about science and maths.

这是一本谋杀悬疑小说。Siobhan说我应该写一些我自己想读的东西。我主要读科学和数学方面的书。

I do not like proper novels. In proper novels people say things like, ‘I am veined with iron, with silver and with streaks of common mud. I cannot contract into the firm fist which those clenches who do not depend on stimulus. ’ What does this mean? I do not know. Nor does Father. Nor do Siobhan or Mr Jeavons. I have asked them.

我不喜欢正统的小说。在正规的小说里,人们会说这样的话:“我身上有铁丝、银丝,还有一道道普通的泥巴。我不能像那些不依赖刺激的人那样紧握拳头。”这是什么意思?我不知道。也没有父亲。Siobhan和Jeavons先生也没有。我问过他们。

 

Siobhan has long blonde hair and wears glasses which are made of green plastic. And Mr Jeavons smells of soap and wears brown shoes that have approximately 60 tiny circular holes in each of them. But I do like murder mystery novels. So, I am writing a murder mystery novel. In a murder mystery novel, someone has to work out who the murderer is and then catch them. It is a puzzle. If it is a good puzzle you can sometimes work out the answer before the end of the book. Siobhan said that the book should begin with something to grab people’s attention. That is why I started with the dog. I also started with the dog because it happened to me and I find it hard to imagine things which did not happen to me.

Siobhan有一头长长的金发,戴着绿色塑料眼镜。Jeavons先生闻起来有肥皂的味道,穿着棕色的鞋子,鞋子上有大约60个小圆洞。但我确实喜欢谋杀悬疑小说。所以,我正在写一本谋杀悬疑小说。在谋杀悬疑小说中,必须有人找出谁是凶手,然后抓住他们。这是个谜。如果这是一个很好的谜题,你有时可以在书的最后找出答案。Siobhan说,这本书应该以吸引人们注意力的东西开始。这就是为什么我从狗开始。我也从狗开始,因为它发生在我身上,我发现很难想象没有发生在我身上的事情。

 

那我们接下来, 将找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子!

Analysis – Page 1

1. Garden fork sticking out of dog =花园的叉子从狗身上伸出来

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The garden fork was sticking out of the grass.

花园叉从草丛中伸出来。

b) You can use that big garden fork sticking out over there.

你可以使用那根伸出来的大花园叉。

 

2. Knelt beside =跪在旁边

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The dog knelt beside its owner.

狗在其主人旁边跪下。

b) He knelt beside her and put her hand in his.

他跪在她旁边,把手放在他的身边。

 

3. Muzzle = 口鼻

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The dog’s muzzle was wet.

狗的口鼻是湿的。

b) The muzzle is for detecting scents.

口鼻是用于检测气味的。

 

4. Poodle =贵宾犬

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) Poodles are one of the most popular house pets.

贵宾犬是最受欢迎的室内宠物之一。

b) This poodle is incredibly cute.

这只贵宾犬非常的可爱。

5

Analysis – Page 2

5. faithful =忠于

 

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I’m a faithful reader of your blog.

我是您博客的忠实读者。

b) He’s been a faithful friend to me.

他是我的忠实朋友。

 

6. For Christ’s sake =看在上帝的份儿上

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) For Christ’s sake, why won’t you believe me?

看在上帝的份儿上, 你为什么不相信我?

b) For Christ’s sake, listen to me.

看在上帝的份儿上, 听我说。

Similar phrases:

For crying out loud = 看在上帝的份儿上

 

7. Hunched up =驼背

例句(illustrative sentences):

c) She sat hunched up by the fire.

她在火堆旁弯腰地坐着。

d) When you use a desk, your shoulders get hunched up.

当你使用办公桌时,你会驼背的。

 

 

 

 

 

 

7

 

Analysis – Page 3

8. Murder mystery novel =谋杀神秘小说

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) My favourite book genre is murder mystery.

我最喜欢的书籍类型是谋杀之谜。

b) This is my favourite murder mystery film.

这是我最喜欢的谋杀神秘片。

 

9. Proper = 适当

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) We should have a proper discussion about this work.

我们应该对此工作进行适当的讨论。

b) She’s the only one in the family with a proper job.

她是家庭中唯一有适当工作的人。

 

10. Work out = 解决

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) We’ve been trying to work out the answer to this puzzle.

我们一直在努力解决这个难题的答案。

b) This maths question is too difficult for me to work out.

这个数学问题对我来说太难了。

Other meanings: 其他含义:

Work out = 锻炼

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I try and work out once a week at the gym.

我尝试在健身房每周锻炼一次。

b) He usually works out after work.

他通常在下班后锻炼身体。

 

11. Grab people’s attention = 引起了人们的注意。

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) This newspaper headline will grab people’s attention.

该报纸头条将引起人们的注意。

b) He grabs people’s attention by being funny.

他通过幽默而引起了人们的注意。

 

Bridget Jone’s Diary

Noon. London: my flat.

中午。伦敦:我的公寓。

Ugh. The last thing on earth I feel physically, emotionally or mentally equipped to do is drive to Una and Geoffrey Alconbury’s New Year’s Day Turkey Curry Buffet in Grafton Underwood. Geoffrey and Una Alconbury are my parents’ best friends and, as Uncle Geoffrey never tires of reminding me, have known me since I was running round the lawn with no clothes on. My mother rang up at 8.30 in the morning last August Bank Holiday and forced me to promise to go. She approached it via a cunningly circuitous route.

啊。从身体上,情感上和心理上看,我现在最不适应做的一件事就是开车到格拉,去参加Una和 Geoffrey Alconbury的新年火鸡咖喱自助餐。Geoffrey Alconbury和Una Alconbury是我父母最好的朋友们,Geoffrey 叔叔就一直不厌倦地告诉我,当我小时候在草坪上不穿衣服地奔跑时他就认识我了。去年八月银行假日的早晨,我母亲就绕着弯地和我说这件事,并且还在早上8点半就给我打电话,强迫我答应去。

 

‘Oh, hello, darling. I was just ringing to see what you wanted for Christmas.’

“哦,你好,亲爱的。我只是想看看你圣诞节想要什么。”

‘Christmas?’

“圣诞?”

 

‘Would you like a surprise, darling?’

“亲爱的,你想要一个惊喜吗?”

`No!’ I bellowed, ‘Sorry. I mean…’

“不!”我大声说出,“抱歉。我的意思是 … ”

‘I wondered if you’d like a set of wheels for your suitcase.’

“我想知道你是否想要一套带轮子来配你的手提箱。”

‘But I haven’t got a suitcase.’

“但是我没有手提箱。”

‘Why don’t I get you a little suitcase with wheels attached. You know, like air hostesses have.’

“那正好我给你一个带轮子的小手提箱。你知道,就像空姐一样。”

‘I’ve already got a bag.’

“我已经有一个包了。”

‘Oh, darling, you can’t go around with that tatty green canvas thing. You look like some sort of Mary Poppins person who’s fallen on hard times. Just a little compact case with a pull-out handle. It’s amazing how much you can get in. Do you want it in navy on red or red on navy?’

“哦,亲爱的,你不能随便拿着那个破烂的绿色帆布包。你看起来像是在艰难时期陷入困境的Mary Poppins。你只需要一个带有拉手的小巧箱子。而且它还有惊奇的容量。你想要红底配海蓝色还是海蓝底色配红色?”

‘Mum. It’s eight thirty in the morning. It’s summer. It’s very hot. I don’t want an air-hostess bag.’

“妈妈现在是早上八点三十分。夏天到了。这里非常热。我不要空姐包。”

‘Julie Enderby’s got one. She says she never uses anything else.’

“Julie·Enderby有一个。她说有了它,根本不需要其它的。”

‘Who’s Julie Enderby?’

“谁是Julie·Enderby?”

‘ You know Julie, darling? Mavis Enderby’s daughter. Julie! The one that’s got that super-dooper job at Arthur Andersen . . . ‘

“你知道Julie,亲爱的!Mavis·Enderby的女儿。Julie!在Arthur Andersen有超级棒工作的人…”

‘Mum . . . ‘

“妈妈…”

‘Always takes it on her trips . . . ‘

“她总是在旅途中带着它…”

‘I don’t want a little bag with wheels on.’

“我不要带轮子的小箱子。”

‘I’ll tell you what. Why don’t Jamie, Daddy and I all club together and get you a proper new big suitcase and a set of wheels?’

“我告诉你吧。为什么杰米、爸爸和我不一起给你买一个新的大箱子和一套轮子呢?”

Exhausted, I held the phone away from my ear, puzzling about where the missionary luggage-Christmas-gift zeal had stemmed from. When I put the phone back she was saying: ‘… in actual fact, you can get them with a compartment with bottles for your bubble bath and things. The other thing I thought of was a shopping trolley.’

精疲力竭的我把电话从耳边拿开,苦苦思索着这个传教士行李箱-圣诞节礼物狂热的发源处。当我把电话放回去时,她正在说:“……实际上,你可以把它们和装泡泡浴的瓶子放在一个小隔间里。我想到的另一件事是购物车。”

‘Is there anything you’d like for Christmas?’ I said desperately, blinking in the dazzling Bank Holiday sun-light.

“你圣诞节想要什么礼物吗?”我绝望地说,在银行假日耀眼的阳光下眨着眼睛。

‘No, no,’ she said airily. ‘I’ve got everything I need. Now, darling,’ she suddenly hissed, ‘you will be coming to Geoffrey and Una’s New Year’s Day Turkey Curry Buffet this year, won’t you?’

“不,不,”她轻快地说。“我需要的东西都有了。“现在,亲爱的,”她突然发出嘘声,“今年你会来参加Geoffrey和Una的新年火鸡咖喱自助餐,是吗?”

 

那我们接下来, 将找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子!

Analysis – Page 1

1. The last thing on earth = 地球上的最后一件事情

例句

a) The last thing on earth I want to do right now is to go to sleep.

我现在想做的最后一件事情就是去睡觉。

b)  I wouldn’t eat this, even if it was the last thing on earth.

即使它是地球上的最后的食物,我也不会吃它的。

 

2. August Bank Holiday = 八月的银行假日

场景应用:银行假日是大多数企业和非基本服务行业关闭的日子。 全年在英国有几个法定的银行假日。

a) Oh, I can’t wait for the August Bank Holiday, this summer has been so long.

哦,这个夏天实在是太长了, 我真的迫不及待地希望它早点到八月的银行假日。

b) Oh, it’s so nice, August is my favorite month because there is August Bank Holiday.

哦,这太好了,八月份是我最喜欢的月份,因为它有八月的银行假日。

3. Never tires = 永不厌倦/总是喜欢

例句:

a)  I never tire of visiting this city.

我从不厌倦参观这座城市。

b) Will you never tire of hearing this song?

你会不会厌倦听这首歌?

4. Cunningly circuitous route = 狡猾的循环路线

a) I took us on a circuitous route so I could spend more time with her.

我带我们到了循环的路上,所以我可以花更多的时间和她在一起。

b) I wish you could just tell me straight, instead of taking me on such a circuitous route

我希望你可以和我直说,而不是一直带我绕弯子。

5. I was just ringing= 我只是打电话想说

例句:

a) I was just ringing to ask you a question.

我只是打电话想问你一个问题。

b) I was just ringing to catch up with you.

我只是打电话想看看你最近怎么样。

6. Tatty = 脏/邋遢

例句:

a) Your clothes are too tatty for the job interview.

你的衣服太脏了,不太适合面试。

b) He arrived in his tatty, old car.

他开着一辆破旧的车就到了。

 

7.  Fallen on hard times = 陷入困境

例句:

a) She’s fallen on hard times and can’t pay the rent = 她陷入困境,无法支付房租。

b) If you fall on hard times you can ask your parents for help = 如果你遇到困难,可以向父母寻求帮助。

 

8. Super-dooper = 太棒了

例句:

a) This is a super-dooper idea.

这是一个超级棒的想法。

b) This is a super-dooper piece of work.

这是一项非常好的工作。

 

场景应用(scenario applications): 非常非正式

 

9. Club together = 聚在一起

 

例句:

a) Shall we club together to buy him a present?

我们要不要一起凑钱为他买礼物呢?

b) If our parents club together, we can afford to buy that apartment

如果我们的父母一起凑钱,我们就有能力购买那套公寓。

 

10. Puzzling about = 困扰

a) I was puzzling about where to go on holiday.

我对去哪里度假感到困扰。

b) I was puzzling about this difficult math question.

我对这项数学题感到非常困扰。

 

11.Stemmed from = 来源

a) This idea stemmed from my experience using other products.

这个想法源于我使用其他产品的经验。

b) Our problems stemmed from a lack of money.

我们的问题源于缺乏资金。

Twilight暮光之城

PREFACE

I’d never given much thought to how I would die— though I’d had reason enough in the last few months — but even if I had, I would not have imagined it like this. I stared without breathing across the long room, into the dark eyes of the hunter, and he looked pleasantly back at me.

前言

我从来没有想过我会怎么死——尽管最近几个月我有足够的理由——但是即使我有想过,我也不会认为会是这样的。 我屏住呼吸,望着长长的房间,望着猎人的黑眼睛,他也愉快地回望着我。

Surely it was a good way to die, in the place of someone else, someone I loved. Noble, even. That ought to count for something. I knew that if I’d never gone to Forks, I wouldn’t be facing death now. But, terrified as I was, I couldn’t bring myself to regret the decision. When life offers you a dream so far beyond any of your expectations, it’s not reasonable to grieve when it comes to an end. The hunter smiled in a friendly way as he sauntered(漫步) forward to kill me.

当然,这是一个好的死亡方法,有另一个人在,而这个人又是我爱的人。甚至有些高贵。 这至少代表着什么。 我知道,如果我从未去过福克斯小镇,我现在就不会面临死亡。 但是,就算我现在害怕,我也不能后悔自己的决定。当生活给你一个远远超出你预期的梦想时,没有理由在它结束时悲伤。猎人友好地笑了笑,从容地走向前去杀了我。

FIRST SIGHT

第一眼

My mother drove me to the airport with the windows rolled down. It was seventy-five degrees in Phoenix, the sky a perfect, cloudless blue. I was wearing my favorite shirt — sleeveless, white eyelet lace; I was wearing it as a farewell gesture. My carry-on item was a parka. In the Olympic Peninsula of northwest Washington State, a small town named Forks exists under a near-constant cover of clouds. It rains on this inconsequential(无足轻重的) town more than any other place in the United States of America. It was from this town and its gloomy, omnipresent(无处不在的) shade that my mother escaped with me when I was only a few months old. It was in this town that I’d been compelled to spend a month every summer until I was fourteen. That was the year I finally put my foot down; these past three summers, my dad, Charlie, vacationed with me in California for two weeks instead. It was to Forks that I now exiled myself — an action that I took with great horror. I detested (厌恶)Forks. I loved Phoenix. I loved the sun and the blistering(极热的) heat. I loved the vigorous(有活力的), sprawling (杂乱的)city.

我的母亲打开车窗,开着车送我到机场。 凤凰城是七十五度,天空是完美无云的蓝色。 我穿着我最喜欢的衬衫-无袖白色孔雀眼花边; 我以告别的姿态穿着它。 我的随身物品是一件派克大衣。 在华盛顿州西北部的奥林匹克半岛,一个名叫福克斯的小镇存在于几乎恒定的云层之下。 这个不起眼的小镇上的降雨比美国任何其他地方都要多。 当我只有几个月大的时候,我母亲带着我逃离了这个城市和它那无处不在的阴暗处。 每年夏天,我不得不在这个小镇度过一个月,直到我十四岁。 那年我终于做了决定。 在过去的三个夏天中,我父亲查理都会在在加利福尼亚与我一起度假了两个星期。现在,我让自己离开了福克斯小镇——采取了这一行动让我自己都震惊。我讨厌福克斯。我爱凤凰城。我喜欢阳光和烈热。我喜欢这个蓬勃发展的城市。

“Bella,” my mom said to me – the last of a thousand times before I got on the plane. “You don’t have to do this.” My mom looks like me, except with short hair and laugh lines. I felt a spasm (一阵发作)of panic as I stared at her wide, childlike eyes. How could I leave my loving, erratic(古怪的), hare-brained (轻率的)mother to fend (照顾)for herself? Of course, she had Phil now, so the bills would probably get paid, there would be food in the refrigerator, gas in her car, and someone to call when she got lost, but still ……

“贝拉,”我妈妈对我说——在我上飞机前的最后一千次。 “你不必这样做。”我妈妈和我长得很像,除了短发和笑纹。当我盯着她那双大大的、孩子气的眼睛时,我感到一阵恐慌。我怎么能让我那爱我的、古怪的、轻率的母亲自己照顾自己呢? 当然,她现在有菲尔了,所以账单可能会付得起,冰箱里有食物,车里有汽油,她迷路时有人会打电话给她,但还是……

“I want to go,” I lied. I’d always been a bad liar, but I’d been saying this lie so frequently lately that it sounded al-most convincing now.

“我想去”,我骗她。我一直不会说谎话,但是最近我一直在说谎,所以现在听起来几乎令人信服。

“Tell Charlie I said hi.”

“代我向查理问好。”

“I will.”

“我会的。”

 

“I’ll see you soon,” she insisted. “You can come home whenever you want, I’ll come right back as soon as you need me.” But I could see the sacrifice in her eyes behind the promise.

她坚持说:“我们会很快再见。” “你随时可以回家,有需要时我会马上回来。”但我能从她眼中看到承诺背后的牺牲。

 

“Don’t worry about me,” I urged. “It’ll be great. I love you, Mom.”

我敦促:“不要担心我。” “一切都会很好。妈妈,我爱你。”

Sound tracks施濠博:https://pan.baidu.com/s/1CSNtoq-35Zc81PUDL_eauw 提取码: swnw

那我们接下来, 找出这篇文章有趣又有用的短语和句子

Analysis – Page 1

1. I’d never given much thought = 我从来没有想过那么多

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I’d never given much thought to what I would do after I graduate.

我从没想过毕业后我到底要做什么。

b) It’s a subject my teacher had never given much thought to.

这个问题,我的老师从来没有想过太多。

2. Reason enough = 足够的理由

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) It’s raining, that’s reason enough not to leave the house

下雨了就是足够的理由,不要离开屋子。

b) Smoking is bad for your health, surely that’s reason enough to stop smoking?

既然吸烟对你的健康有害,这肯定是足够的原因停止吸烟吧。

3. Ought to count for something = 应该有所作为

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I know this essay wasn’t good, but my previous essays ought to count for something.

我知道这篇论文不太好,但是我以前的文章应该也会有所作为吧。

b) His promise ought to count for something, he will finish it.

他的诺言应该是有分量的,他会完成的。

 

4. Sauntered = 闲逛

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) She sauntered in fifteen minutes late.

她迟到了十五分钟。

b) He sauntered by with his hands in his pockets.

他双手插在口袋里徘徊。

 

5. Hunter = 猎人

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) The hunter shot the deer.

这个猎人射杀了鹿。

b) The hunter is following the tiger.

猎人正在追随老虎。

6. White eyelet lace = 白色孔雀眼花边

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) Her wedding dress was a beautifully long, white eyelet lace dress.

她的婚纱是一条漂亮的白色长孔眼蕾丝礼服。

b) She put out her favourite white eyelet lace tablecloth.

她拿出自己喜欢的白色鸡眼花边桌布。

7. Carry-on item = 随身行李

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) How many carry-on items are we allowed?

我们允许携带几件随身物品?

b) Sorry Sir, this carry-on item is too big.

抱歉,先生,这个随身物品太大了。

8. Parka = 派克外套

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) This parka will keep you warm.

这套风衣外套会让你保持温暖。

b) She held both sides of the parka hood to protect herself from the snow.

她握着风衣外套的两侧,以保护来自己不受雪灾。

9. Omnipresent = 无所不在

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) Advertisements are omnipresent these days.

这些天广告真的是无处不在。

b) There’s an omnipresent background noise in the city.

城市里有无处不在的背景噪音。

Omni是许多单词的前部分。Omni 的意思是无所什么…… 其中最常见的是:

Omnipresent = 无所不在

Omniscient = 无所不知

Omnipotent = 无所不能

 

10. I’d been compelled to = 我被强迫的 /我不得不怎么样

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) We can’t compel you to do your work, but we think you should.

我们不能强迫你去做你的工作,但我们认为你应该这样做。

b) I’m compelled to study harder.

我不得不努力学习。

 

11. Put my foot down = 放下脚/下定决心

例句(illustrative sentences):

a) I’m putting my foot down, you’re not going to the party.

我做了这个决定,你不应该去参加聚会。

b) He wanted to drop out of university, but his parents put their foot down.

他想离开大学,但是他的父母决定了不能这个样子。